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Abstract
Cognitive theories of depression have long posited automatic interpretation biases (AIB)
as a central contributor to depressed mood. The current study was first to examine AIB in a
clinically defined depressed sample. While assessing AIB using a semantic association
paradigm, pupillary reactivity was simultaneously recorded to build insight into the AIB process.
A total of 53 individuals (25 depressed and 28 healthy control) completed the Word Sentence
Association Paradigm for Depression (WSAP-D) while pupillary reactivity was recorded.
Results revealed the depressed group was significantly more likely to endorse negative AIB and
less likely to endorse benign AIB compared to healthy controls. The depressed group
demonstrated a modest effect size difference indicating they were faster to endorse negative AIB
compared to the healthy controls, but did not differ in endorsing benign AIB or in rejecting either
valence. Pupillary reactivity was found to differentiate behaviorally defined AIB type from a
natural processing condition when counter to theorized, group relevant AIB. The depressed
group demonstrated greater initial pupillary constriction during initial presentation of ambiguous
information and comparatively less pupillary dilation during and after endorsing a benign AIB.
Taken together, the results suggest that theorized negative AIB and lack of benign AIB are
characteristic of depression, that greater cognitive effort is required to reject interpretations
consistent with theorized biases consistent with reinterpretation processes, and that depressed
individuals are less engaged with benign AIB compared to healthy controls, possibly associated
with hedonic deficits. Theoretical implications and future directions are discussed.
vii

Chapter One:
Introduction

Cognitive theories of psychopathology highlight the central role that automatic negative
thoughts play in the etiology and maintenance of depression. Interpretation can feed automatic
thoughts via slow and effortful elaborations or via more automatic processes. Automatic
interpretation biases have been understudied, largely due to difficulty matching the timescale of
experimental procedures to the timescale of the automatic interpretation biases. The present
study reviews evidence of interpretation biases in depression and uses pupillary reactivity
measures to better understand the emotional information processing involved in automatic
interpretation biases.
Cognitive Theory of Depression
Cognition has been central to the conceptualization of depression for over half a century
(Beck, 1963; 1979). Aaron Beck’s influential cognitive theory of depression focused on
schemas, or beliefs, as the organizing subcomponents of thoughts (Beck, 1967; 1979). A schema
is an informational shortcut; rather than processing every detail of the situation, the schema fills
in meaning based on a subset of environmental cues. More recent cognitive theories have
focused on information processing, or the processes by which stimuli from the environment are
noticed (attention), appraised or judged (interpretation), and referenced for comparison (memory;
Mathews & MacLeod, 2005).
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Cognitive theories of depression have focused largely on three information processing
components that may contribute to the onset and maintenance of depression: attention,
interpretation, and memory (Beck, 1987; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).
Theorized negative biases or distortions in these processes are hypothesized to increase
vulnerability to and then maintain depression and other emotional disorders (Beck, 1987;
Beevers, 2005; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).
Information processing loops are implicated in a potentially vicious cycle that maintains
depression: Negative mood produces a tendency to attend to negative information, to assign
negative meaning (i.e., negatively interpret) to ambiguous information, and to recall negative
information, all of which are, in turn, presumed to help maintain the negative mood (Beck, 1987;
Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999). Although depicted as circular, it is not possible to specify an exact
sequence of events because the components likely interact (Beevers, 2005; Williams, Watts,
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988).
Cognitive theories of depression integrate negative affect into the cognitive vicious cycle
(Beck, 1987; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988) with particular focus on “hot”
emotion-laden cognitions (Ellis, 1994). One issue when studying fast, automatic information
processing is that it is difficult to make a sharp distinction between cognition and emotion. In
cognitive neuroscience, examinations of appraisal (i.e., meaning taken from stimuli perception)
and reappraisal (i.e., changing the initial meaning taken from stimuli perception) processes representing interactions between cognition and emotion - overlap in neural circuitry,
particularly in cortico-limbic neurocircuits (Otto, Misra, Prasad, & McRae, 2014; WilsonMendenhall, Barrett, & Barsalou, 2015).
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The overlap and interconnectivity between cognitive and emotional processing
neurologically and phenomenologically speak to the value of examining automatic interpretation
biases in depression. Examining these automatic biases using measures which can capture
elements of this interaction, such as pupillary reactivity, during participant responses to
emotionally salient and ambiguous information, can aid understanding of these biases. An
improved understanding of the interaction between cognitive and emotional elements in
information processing will help better characterize depression and, potentially, facilitate the
development of treatments that directly target the cognitive components maintaining this
disorder.
Interpretation Processes
Interpretation processes are a central aspect of information processing because they
function to integrate the information provided by attention, emotion, and memory (Beevers,
2005; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). In essence,
interpretations function as the theoretical schemas discussed by cognitive theorists, in that
interpretations are the information processing component that functions to yield meaning, based
on current context and past experience, for the current situation (Beck, 1987; Beck & Haigh,
2014; Beevers, 2005; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews,
1988). Beck and Haigh (2014) discuss automatic interpretations (i.e., protoschemas) as the
primary activation of schemas that monitor, detect, and abstract data from the environment for
survival-based needs.
When the interpretation fits the true environmental context, it is accurate and would not
be considered biased. When inaccurate interpretations are successfully challenged by further
information in the environment, or from the individual’s explicit effort, then again the individual
3

can be successful in the environmental context, even if at a slower pace. Unfortunately, outside
of laboratory contexts, it is difficult to know the “true” environmental context, and it is therefore
difficult to evaluate bias in an absolute sense. It is often easier to examine relative biases in terms
of comparison of interpretation patterns between psychologically healthy versus unhealthy
individuals. Psychologically healthy individuals have consistently demonstrated a positive
interpretation bias in which they interpret standardized ambiguous information as positive
(Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). By contrast, negative interpretations which are not accurate in the
environmental context (e.g., interpreting others’ smiles as derisive) and which go unchallenged
are likely to decrease effective reactions to the environment (e.g., withdrawing because you
believe others are making fun of you). It is these negatively biased interpretations which are
theorized to drive depressive and other emotional disorders.
Interpretation occurs on a continuum of speed and automaticity. More automatic
interpretations function to quickly determine if a stimulus is good or bad and then activate the
appropriate affective and behavioral systems based on the initial evaluation. More reflective,
elaborative interpretations then reevaluate the initial conclusions, correcting the judgments as
more information is integrated from either attention to the environment or memories of similar
experiences (Mathews, 2012; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Ouimet, Gawronski, & Dozois, 2009,
Wisco, 2009). Although the automaticity of interpretation biases reside on a continuum,
researchers often focus on the extremes of this continuum, and discuss automatic and
reflective/elaborative processing as separate systems that interact to assign meaning. Clinically,
automatic interpretations may reflect the automatic thought while elaborative/reflective
interpretations may reflect reappraisal processes. Despite a central role in the cognitive
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conceptualization of depression, the process of interpretation and interpretation biases, especially
automatic interpretation biases, remain poorly understood.
Automatic and Elaborative Interpretation Biases
Recent iterations of the cognitive theory of depression emphasize distinction between
automatic and reflective systems of cognition (Beck & Haigh, 2014). The automatic system
processes information rapidly (< 1500ms), uses few cognitive resources, and is triggered by or
vigilant for events signaling loss, threat, or gain. The reflective system processes information
slowly (> 5000ms), is resource demanding, and is controlled and deliberate. These systems work
in tandem, the automatic making quick, primary judgments and the reflective working to correct
or modify those judgments. In essence, the automatic system decides whether something is good
or bad and should be approached or avoided, whereas the reflective system reevaluates the
accuracy of the automatic system’s initial appraisal if given time and resources (Beck & Haigh,
2014).
From a neuroscience perspective, automatic and reflective processes do not appear
completely separate. Interpretation processes likely correlate with cortico-limbic neurocircuitry
in the dorsolateral prefontrol cortext (DLPFC) and rostral anterior cingulate cortex (rACC;
Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011). The DLPFC is a component of the cognitive control
network, which is associated with making controlled, effortful cognition (Breakelaar, et al.,
2017). The rACC is a component of the salience network which makes rapid estimates of
valence and personal investment (Mennon, 2015). However, both the DLPFC and ACC are part
of the default mode network, which is thought to represent resting state “thinking activity” and is
abnormally active in depression (Korgaonkar, Fornito, Williams, & Grieve, 2014). Taken
together, it appears key neurological structures lie within different and the same neurocircuits
5

depending on the type of cognition being studied. Although we cannot expect to tease apart the
automatic and reflective components of interpretation biases given likely neurological overlap in
activity, assessing ongoing and active processing of standardized stimuli may help us better
understand the process of interpretation biases.
Importantly, cognitive theories emphasize dysfunction at the automatic processing level
in depression (i.e., automatic thoughts drive the disorder; Beck, 1979; Beck &Haigh, 2014;
Beevers, 2005). Biases in automatic processes are postulated to create vulnerabilities to
emotional disorders (Beevers, 2005; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Theoretically, such automatic
biases can be corrected only if the individual becomes aware of their automatic thoughts and
consciously devotes cognitive resources to challenge the thoughts (Beevers, 2005; however see
Jones & Sharpe, 2017 and Koster, Hoorelbeke, Onradt, Owens, & Derakshan, 2017 for studies
which modify cognitive biases without conscious awareness in anxiety and depression). Thought
challenging is a technique in cognitive therapy designed to increase the interaction between the
two levels of processing (Beck, 1979, 1987) and which is associated with neurological changes,
including strengthened connectivity between the amygdala and both the ACC and prefrontal
cortices (Fischer, Keller, & Etkin, 2016; Goldapple, et al., 2004).
Despite the theorized importance of automatic processing biases in depression, it has
proven difficult to document their presence. As the primary interpretation of an ambiguous
stimulus, automatic interpretations may be difficult to observe because of their rapidity:
Generally, they occur within 1500ms of stimulus presentation. By contrast, reflective level, or
elaborative, interpretation biases have been demonstrated for decades (see Gotlib & Joorman,
2010; MacLeod & Mathews, 2005; Wisco, 2009 for reviews), possibly because the slower
timescale (>5000ms) is easier to study. There is consistent evidence of elaborative interpretation
6

biases in depression (Wisco, 2009). However, in part because elaborative interpretations assess
past and current experience while integrating new information, it is difficult to pinpoint where
and when in the information processing stream negative interpretation originates. For instance, it
is unclear what portion of the elaborative bias is based on automatic interpretations, response
tendencies, or comparative processing. We cannot assume that elaborative biases reflect
automatic biases because of the interconnected nature of elaborative processing, especially over
extended time. This has led to calls for empirical research to strive to observe and understand
automatic cognitive processes generally, and automatic interpretation biases specifically (Beck &
Haigh, 2014).
Empirical Evidence for Elaborative Interpretation Biases in Depression
Further evidence of elaborative interpretation biases comes from Emily Holmes and her
colleagues using an imagery based interpretation bias paradigm that presents scenarios which
remain ambiguous until the final word, presented as a fragment (e.g. e _ j _ y = enjoy), resolves
the ambiguity in either a positive or negative manner (Holmes et al, 2006). Scenario-based
paradigms with word fragments have reliably demonstrated reflective negative interpretation
biases in dysphoric and depressed samples (Blackwell & Holmes, 2010; Blackwell et al., 2015;
Holmes et al., 2008, 2009; Joormann, Waugh, & Gotlib, 2015; Lang et al., 2012), as well as at
risk samples (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009). Compared to healthy controls, generally depressotypic
individuals resolve the scenarios negatively more often and positively less often, reflecting a lack
of positive biases (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009) as well as the presence of a negative bias (Holmes et
al., 2008, 2009).
Unfortunately, elaborative interpretation biases are limited by confounding processes.
First, elaborative interpretation biases are difficult to distinguish from response styles (e.g.,
7

generally choosing the most negative option) and expectancy biases (i.e., choosing options
believed to be expected by others). Second, elaborative interpretation biases are highly
intercorrelated with both attention and memory biases (Everaert, Duyck, Eouter, & Koster, 2014;
Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013; Joormann,
Waugh, & Gotlib, 2015). These intercorrelations are especially troubling given evidence that
depressed persons tend to attend to negative environmental information for longer periods of
time (Kellough et al., 2008; for reviews see Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Teachman, Jorrmann,
Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012) and tend to recall negative information more easily than neutral or
positive information (for reviews see Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Matthews & MacLeod, 2005).
This makes it difficult to disentangle elaborative interpretation biases from other aspects of
biased cognition.
Indeed, in some paradigms, interpretation biases are taken from participant’s memory of
scenarios. In these paradigms, ratings of how associated comprehension statements are with
ambiguous scenarios are recorded after all scenarios have been viewed – requiring participants to
use their memory of the scenarios to make their interpretations minutes after seeing all scenarios
(Bowler et al., 2017; Pictet, Jermann, Ceschi, 2016). Given that time allows for other information
to be incorporated into (or elaborated on) the meaning assigned to the ambiguous stimuli, it is
unsurprising that attention and memory biases are associated with elaborative interpretation
biases (Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012; Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013;
Joormann, Waugh, & Gotlib, 2015).
Further, combined methods studies which integrate attention bias assessment during an
interpretation bias task – the Scrambled Sentences Task (Romero et al., 2014; Rude et al., 2002;
Wenzlaff & Bates, 1998), have found not only a strong relationship between attentional
8

preference for unambiguous negative information and negative interpretation biases (De Raedt &
Koster, 2010; Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012), but has repeatedly demonstrated the
centrality of interpretation biases in forming negative memories (Everaert, Duyck, Eouter, &
Koster, 2014; Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo, & Koster, 2013). Within the combined cognitive bias
hypothesis (Everaert, Koster, Derakshan, 2012), the interplay between cognitive biases has
repeatedly demonstrated depressive preference for negative interpretations in the simultaneous
presence of both a positive and negative option. Pathway analyses testing the combined cognitive
bias hypothesis found that negative interpretation bias was central to forming memory biases
with no direct effect of attention biases on memory. Further, this study demonstrated that
interpretation bias accounted for the majority of variance in depressive symptoms with no
significant contributions of either memory or attention biases (Sanchez, Duque, Romero, &
Vazquez, 2017).
These studies highlight two important principles. First, that these cognitive biases are
interconnected and follow the path of attention -> interpretation -> memory (Evereart et al.,
2017; Sanchez et al., 2017). Second, these studies show that when given unambiguous
information for a positive meaning (e.g., “winner”) simultaneously with a negative meaning
(e.g., “loser”), depressive individuals will choose the negative to describe themselves. While
these studies provide some insight into how various cognitive biases interact in depression, they
do not tell us about automatic interpretation biases specifically. Across these studies, participants
are given as much time as they prefer (with an 8 second limit) to process the information before
providing their responses – ample time to compare possibilities, reinterpret the information
presented, or guess as to what the experimenter is hoping to discover. Thus, although this area of
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research provides insight into the importance of interpretation biases in depression, these studies
do not necessarily capture automatic interpretation biases.
Obstacles to Observing Automatic Interpretation Biases
One impediment to studying automatic emotional information processing biases, such as
automatic interpretation biases, is that, by definition, automatic biases occur quickly (<1500ms).
The few studies which have examined automatic biases (including three of our own) suggest
biased processing can be detected within one second of stimulus presentation, as indexed by
behavioral responses occurring at 1200ms on average (Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; Cowden
Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015; 2017; Mobius et al., 2015; Sears, Bisson, & Nielson, 2011; Siegle
et al., 2001, 2003). Despite consistency across laboratories, we do not know when the bias forms
in response to an ambiguous cue. Few indices of emotional information processing in
depression, outside of gaze-tracking attention paradigms and experimental semantic association
interpretation tasks such as our own, are suited to studying automatic processes at this brief
timescale.
A second, related, obstacle is that as observed clinically, automatic thoughts are difficult
for individuals to identify and report accurately. However, an individual’s automatic thoughts
could only be accessed via self-report methodology, which by definition allows time to
reconsider or weigh options. An extensive literature using self-report measures reports negative
interpretation biases in depression (for reviews, see Matthews & MacLeod, 2005; Wisco, 2009).
Increasingly, researchers are aware of the ways in which self-reports of automatic thinking are
prone to error and bias, especially with depressed individuals (Mathews & MacLeod, 2005;
Wisco, 2009) who have a demonstrated negative memory bias (see Gotlib & Joorman, 2010 for
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review) and difficulty identifying their automatic thoughts generally (Kircanski, Joormann, &
Gotlib, 2012).
In the study of anxiety disorders, these methodological difficulties have been addressed
by use of computerized cognitive bias assessment paradigms to evaluate interpretation biases.
Such computer tasks have included priming paradigms (e.g., an unambiguous word or image is
presented prior to an ambiguous stimulus with participants asked to interpret the ambiguity)
including the Word Sentence Association Paradigm (Beard & Amir, 2009; Teachman et al.,
2012). Priming paradigms have detected and modified automatic interpretation biases in anxiety
disorders. However, the same paradigms have not been able to detect automatic interpretation
biases in depressed samples (Bison & Sears, 2007; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg, Bradbury,
& Bradley, 2006).
The negative results in studies of depression may stem from methodological factors
related to the types of stimuli used in these paradigms. Generally, stimuli used in these studies
were created for a specific anxiety disorder (e.g., social anxiety or obsessive-compulsive
disorder) or referred to unknown other people, and the unambiguous stimulus was presented
prior to the ambiguous stimulus to prime interpretation in a specific direction. These
characteristics fit with the cognitive conceptualization of anxiety disorders involving an
oversensitive vigilance system to threatening environmental information – thereby reacting to the
negative priming. It was assumed depressed samples would react to the same stimuli simply
because the stimuli were negative in nature. However, depression is cognitively conceptualized
as negative mood affecting the perception of the external world, such that everything appears
worse for the depressed person and better for everyone else. This suggests that utilizing stimuli
which reflect characteristics specific to depression – self-focused and emotionally salient (i.e.,
11

content with emotional relevancy and individual value) – may be key to experimentally
observing automatic interpretation biases in depression. In line with this idea, our work found
that automatic interpretation biases in dysphoric individuals hinged on the use of self-relevant
stimuli (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015; see also Wisco, 2009 for a review in elaborative
biases). Similarly, self-relevance may be an important driver of emotional reactivity in
depression, especially in a laboratory setting, as depressed individuals demonstrate modest
reactivity to generic sad stimuli (Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005, Salomon et al., 2013).
Burgeoning Evidence of Automatic Interpretation Biases
Automatic interpretation biases have proven difficult to demonstrate empirically in
depression until recently. Early attempts to assess automatic interpretation biases in depression
used semantic priming paradigms which were successful in anxiety based samples. Early
semantic priming paradigms presented an unambiguous valenced (i.e., negative, positive, or
neutral) word prior to an ambiguous sentence or scenario to prime a specific interpretation and
did not find behavioral evidence of interpretation biases in depression (Bison & Sears, 2007;
Lawson & MacLeod, 1999; Mogg, Bradbury, & Bradley, 2006). These null effects were puzzling
since these paradigms detected effects among anxious individuals (Beard & Amir, 2009;
Teachman et al., 2012), and because automatic negative interpretation biases were found in other
studies that used non-reaction time indices such as eye-blink startle responses during imaginal
interpretations (Lawson, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2002), number of homophones assigned
negative meaning (e.g., writing “die” rather than “dye”; Mogg, Bradbury, & Bradley, 2006), and
word valence identification tasks (Siegle et al., 2001; 2003). The lack of behavioral response
time evidence of automatic interpretation biases led to suggestions that depression slowed
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reaction times generally (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999) or even that automatic interpretation biases
are non-existent in depression (Wisco, 2009).
Importantly, other work reveals patterns consistent with the existence of automatic
negative interpretation biases, even though these were not interpreted as such. For instance,
Siegle and colleagues made no substantive interpretation of depressed individuals rating nearly
15% of neutral word stimuli as negative, compared to 1% in controls, in a valence identification
task which presented words for 150ms before being masked by a series of X’s (Siegle et al.,
2001; 2003).
Our work has found more direct behavioral evidence of depressive automatic
interpretation biases (Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015;
2017). This work is distinguished by our use of a semantic association paradigm and
incorporation of self-relevant ambiguous stimuli. In contrast to semantic priming paradigms, the
semantic association paradigm presents the ambiguous stimulus without cues as to the possible
meaning of the information. Individuals are then asked if an unambiguous stimulus –a single
word presented immediately after the ambiguous stimulus is removed – is related to the
ambiguous stimulus. Importantly, semantic association paradigms provide two distinct indices of
automatic interpretation biases from a single behavioral response: reaction times and
endorsement rates. In this paradigm, the Word Sentence Association Paradigm for Depression
(WSAP-D; Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012), reaction times assessed how quickly the individual
indicated whether an association between an ambiguous sentence and an unambiguous word
existed. A faster endorsement decision (i.e., indicating the sentence and word are related)
indicates bias because a faster association means the unambiguous word fit the semantic model
(i.e., semantic expectation) already formed by the individual. Endorsement rates reflect the
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proportion of trials in which an individual indicated a word type was related to the ambiguous
sentence, with a higher endorsement rate reflecting a greater likelihood of making a negative
interpretation of ambiguous material. In our past work, we have argued that since both indices
come from a single speeded response, which is generally provided in less than 1200ms, we can
view both indices as relatively automatic, with reaction times higher on the automaticity
continuum of than endorsement rates (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015; 2017).
Importantly, automatic interpretation biases using the WSAP-D were found in three
distinct dysphoric samples (Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg,
2015; 2017). Dysphoric individuals were both faster and more likely to endorse negative
interpretations of ambiguous sentences compared to non-dysphoric controls (Cowden Hindash &
Amir, 2012). We replicated these results in an independent sample while also directly
demonstrating that negative automatic interpretation biases were only observable when the
ambiguous stimulus was self-referent (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015). We further
replicated this finding in a third sample, while demonstrating that automatic negative
interpretation biases can be reduced after a single session of modification training (Cowden
Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017). Dysphoric individuals also demonstrated a greater likelihood to
endorse negative words as related to ambiguous sentences when sentences were presented
aurally, although reaction times did not differ from non-dysphoric individuals (Sears, Bisson, &
Nielsen, 2011). These studies provided relatively consistent evidence of semantic automatic
interpretation biases in currently dysphoric persons. However, these biases have yet to be
reported in a clinically depressed sample, and it remains important to confirm that negative
automatic interpretation biases are characteristic of well-defined depression.
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Delving into the Origins of Automatic Interpretation Biases
As we amass evidence of automatic interpretation biases in depression-prone individuals,
a critical next step is to clarify the processes by which these biases operate. For example, it is
unclear if biases observed in semantic association paradigms are driven by the emotional content
of the words, the ambiguity of the sentences, or by mood congruency effects because a single
behavioral response is recorded after the word is presented. All three possibilities could explain
the observed behavioral differences between groups but could have different implications for the
characterization and treatment of depression. For example, theoretically, ambiguity triggers
negative schemas which lead to negative interpretations. These interpretations then feed a
negative mood. This conceptualization suggests that treatment should focus on eliminating the
negative interpretation bias. However, response biases or mood congruency effects suggest that
depression is better characterized by relating and reacting more strongly to unambiguous
negative material. With negative mood driving effects, treatments should focus on alleviating the
depressed mood with natural resolution of cognitive biases following uplifted affect. Illuminating
the process of interpretation biases may serve to also illuminate what accounts for the behavioral
observations as well as provide clues for potential best targets for treatment.
From a process perspective, it is important to differentiate when the bias begins from
when it is further altered or challenged. For example, reacting to the ambiguity of the sentence
may reflect a projection from mood onto the ambiguous information, which is consistent with
cognitive theory, but reacting emotionally to words alone could reflect mood congruency rather
than extant schematic biases. Although semantic association paradigms provide evidence of
automatic interpretation biases, functioning from a single behavioral response after presentation
of both ambiguous and unambiguous stimuli limits our ability to reveal the underlying process.
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Understanding the formation of automatic interpretation biases by examining when and in
reaction to what biases are taking place could provide a target for direct intervention to deter bias
formation, thereby cutting off the depressive “vicious cycle” (Beck, 1987; Matthews &
MacLeod, 2005; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). As such, an understanding of
cognitive biases and their role in depression may come from use of methodological tools
associated with neurological correlates of cognition and depression.
Neural Correlates of Cognitive Biases in Depression
Generally, it is postulated that information-processing biases reflect cortico-limbic
circuity dysregulation in which prefrontal circuits do not effectively downregulate limbic –
particularly amygdala – reactivity (Disner, Beevers, Haigh, & Beck, 2011). The cortico-limbic
circuits function to inhibit limbic reactivity to environmental stimuli (Brown, Manuck, Flory, &
Hariri, 2006; Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Klauser, et al., 2015).
Individuals with depression have been observed to demonstrate decreased activation of the
DLPFC (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008), particularly during activities which increase limbic
reactivity (Dannlowski et al., 2009; Hooley et al, 2009; Siegle, Thompson, Carter, Sheinhauer, &
Thase, 2007; Johnstone et al., 2007; Klauser, et al., 2015). Tasks assessing cognitive control in
depression also demonstrate hypoactivation of the rACC, which may reflect attempts to control
increased amygdala reactivity (Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; Gianaros et al.,
2008; Yoshimura et al., 2014). Both the DLPFC and rACC are connection points between the
limbic and cortical structures of the brain. That is, these sub-cortex neural circuits are likely
where cortical semantic meaning is attached to limbic perceptual and emotional information,
conceptually akin to interpretation processes. It is thus practical to utilize a psychophysiological
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method associated with activity in these subcortical areas to gain a better understanding of
interpretation biases.
Pupillary Reactivity as a Measure of Cognitive Processes
Physiological measures collected during interpretation bias assessment might reveal
additional insight into the processes taking place, including the processes taking place prior to,
during, and after the formation of interpretation biases. One candidate measure is pupil dilation.
Pupil dilation reflects innervation by both sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system
connections. When activated by the sympathetic connection, the pupil dilator muscle increases
pupil size via neural connections to the posterior hypothalamic nuclei. When activated by the
parasympathetic system, the iris sphincter muscle loosens via central inhibition of the midbrain
Edinger-Westphal complex resulting in increased pupil size (Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, &
Pless, 2004). The pupil constricts during the basic light reflex and the accommodation reflex,
which occurs when the eye lens must refocus on near visual stimuli. For the present study, we
are interested in the psychosensory reflex —small changes in dilation due to emotional and/or
cognitive processes (Beatty &Lucero-Wagoner, 2000). Interestingly, although an autonomic
reflex, the pupillary reflexes – including the light reflex – have been found to be cortically
mediated in both high and low light environments (Wilhelm & Kardon, 1997). Importantly,
psychosensory dilations can occur in response to both sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous
system activation (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000), but dilation purely in response to increased
cognitive effort (i.e., greater cognitive load due to increased task difficulty) appears uniquely
related to parasympathetic activation (Steinhauer, Siegle, Condray, & Pless, 2004). Although it is
difficult to tease apart pupillary reactivity which is related to emotional arousal (Bradley,
Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008) from that which is related to task difficulty (Steinhauer, Siegle,
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Condray, & Pless, 2004) when paradigms use elements of both (Siegle et al., 2001, 2003), there
is a consistent pattern of greater dilation in depression when emotionally salient information
takes greater effort to process (Burkhouse, Siegle, & Gibb, 2014; Siegle et al., 2003)
Given that functional neuroimaging suggests corticolimbic circuit deficiencies are most
likely at play in major depressive disorders (Korgaonkar, Fornito, Williams, & Grieve, 2014) and
that interpretation processes are likely related to sub-cortical neurocircuits, use of a
neurophysiological measure associated with activity in both the DLPFC and rACC is ideal for
increasing our understanding of automatic interpretation biases in depression. Neurological
correlates of pupillary changes include brain regions associated with both emotional information
processing and depressive psychopathology such as the DLPFC (Siegle, Steinhouer, Stenger,
Konecky, & Carter, 2003), amygdala (Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, & Carter, 2002), and
the rACC (Critchley, Tang, Glaser, Butterworth, & Dolan, 2005). These associations suggest that
pupillary reactivity may be indicative of both emotional reactivity and cognitive effort during
emotional information processing, in neural structures associated with depressive disorders
(Ritchey, Dolcos, Eddington, Strauman, & Cabeza, 2011; Rive et al., 2013) that are aligned with
initial information processing circuitry (Kohn, et al., 2014), as well as circuitry specifically
associated with reinterpretation (i.e., reappraisal) based emotion regulation strategies (Dörfel et
al., 2014).
As such, simultaneous collection of pupillometry (i.e., pupil dilation responses) may be a
reasonable place to begin examining the process of automatic interpretation biases. Pupillary
reactivity has already proven useful in illuminating the points at which ruminative processes
begin to take place as late cognitive effort during valenced decision tasks in depressed groups
(Siegle et al., 2001, 2003; Siegle, Steinhauer, & Thase, 2004). In the context of automatic
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interpretation biases, pupillary responses can be recorded during each stage of an experimental
trial. Thus, reactivity to ambiguous information, unambiguous information, and behavioral
response can all be assessed with interpretable measures during each portion of the trial. Further,
pupillary waveforms can be compared across trial types, providing another avenue in which
biases may be examined for the point of greatest cognitive effort and emotional salience. Finally,
pupillary reactivity takes place within milliseconds of stimulus presentation (Fountoulakis, et al.,
1999).
Assessing pupillary reactivity during a semantic association paradigm could also
illuminate when during automatic emotional information processing the interpretation bias is
being formed and expressed. Pupillary reactivity is evident on the time scale (<1500ms) implied
by the reaction time based behavioral index of the automatic bias. Siegle et al. (2001, 2003)
report evidence of initial pupillary response to emotional information beginning at 250ms post
stimulus presentation in a depressed sample. Further, the level of pupil dilation was related to
emotional information processing, as depressed individuals evidenced no change in pupil
response to a purely cognitive working memory task (Siegle et al., 2001, 2003; Siegle,
Steinhauer, & Thase, 2004). Of note, although Siegle and his colleagues were focused on
examining ruminative processes, they reported differences between depressed and non-depressed
groups at early (< 1000ms) stages of processing in all studies. This indicates that pupillary
dilation occurs in the presence of emotionally evocative information with greater dilation change
associated with the level of cognitive effort over time. These aspects of pupillary reactivity make
this index a useful measure of emotional information processing to elucidate the process of
interpretation bias formation throughout trials, as well as when comparing separate trial types.

19

Pupillary reactivity is also an attractive point of departure because alternative methods to
tap the process of interpretation biases, including functional neuroimaging and event related
potentials(ERPs) components have significant potential drawbacks. Functional neuroimaging is
prohibitively costly and struggles with rapid timescales (Laumann, et al., 2017). ERP measures
could be of use when points of comparison during interpretation are already known, particularly
with complex multi-stimulus paradigms. For example, different ERP components reflect
orienting attentional processes (N2; Loveless, 1983; Ritter, Simson, Vaughan, 1983; Satterfield,
Schell, Nicholas, Satterfield, & Freese, 1990), emotion content and mood congruence
(N400;Chung, et al., 1996; Kutas & Hillyard, 1980a; 1980b;), and sustained attention to
emotionally salient information (late positive potential (LPP); Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley,
Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Foti, Hajcak, & Dien, 2009; Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010).
Additionally, some ERP components are associated with prefrontal cortex activation
(MacNamara, Ferri, & Hajcak, 2011). However, each stimulus in the WSAP-D trial would
potentially illicit each of these ERP components. It would be difficult to interpret ERP measures
from the unambiguous word if interpretation first takes place during the presentation of the
sentence because the LPP from the sentence would overlap with the N2 and N400 from the
word. Thus, use of a physiological measure which allows for assessment of neurophysiological
reactivity across the entire trial, such as pupillary reactivity, may provide guidance for future use
of ERPs and fMRI to further tease apart the formation of interpretation biases.
Current Study
The present study had two main aims. First, to replicate the previously observed negative
automatic interpretation biases in symptomatic samples within a clinically defined depressed
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sample. Secondly, to illuminate the process of automatic interpretation biases using pupillary
reactivity indices.
Gaining an understanding of the process involved in the formation of interpretation biases
may help to model how emotional information is processed or distorted as well as pinpoint
intervention targets before the bias is formed. Unfortunately, individuals generally, and
especially those suffering from depression, are unaware of what aspects of the information to
which they are reacting to actually activated their schemas and automatic biases. Integrating
objective indices of cognitive and emotional reactivity into cognitive bias assessment paradigms
may shed light on the process of interpretation bias formation, and particularly on what aspects
of ambiguous information (e.g., self-relevancy, emotional salience, cognitive effort) may play a
role in bias formation.
To better characterize the process of forming an automatic interpretation bias, we used
pupillometry during a semantic association task, the word-sentence association paradigm for
depression (WSAP-D; see detail below). The WASP-D, an experimental semantic association
paradigm has previously demonstrated automatic interpretation biases in dysphoric individuals
(Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015; 2017). We administered
the WSAP-D to individuals diagnosed with major depressive disorder and never-depressed
controls. Four hypotheses were tested, see Table 1 for an overview of our hypotheses. Our
predictions were guided by a cognitive effort perspective on pupillary dilation. We are using
cognitive effort as the driver of pupillary dilation in two of the three hypotheses (hypothesis 3
predicts greater emotional saliency of ambiguous information in MDD) because of evidence that
psychosensory reflexes in depression have been observed when emotional information requires
greater cognitive effort to resolve (Burkhouse, Siegle, & Gibb, 2014; Siegle et al., 2003). Our
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Table 1: Study Hypotheses and Expected Effects
Hypotheses
1. Groups Will Differ
Behaviorally in Observed
Interpretation Biases

Expected Results
- Interaction of Group X Interpretation Bias
- MDD endorse negative interpretations faster and
more often
- HC endorse benign interpretations faster and more
often
2. Pupillary Responses Indicate
- Theory-based Specified Contrasts
Presence of Interpretation Biases
- MDD group will demonstrate greater pupillary
dilation for benign bias trials (reject negative and
endorse benign) compared to sentence only control
condition
- HC group will demonstrate greater pupillary dilation
for negative bias trials (endorse negative and reject
benign) compared to sentence only control
3: Pupillary Responses Indicate
- MDD group demonstrates greater dilation during
Ambiguity is Differentially Salient
ambiguous sentence presentation compared to HC
for Depressed Persons
group
4. Group pupillary reactivity will
- Interaction of Group X Valence X Response
differ based on semantic
- MDD group demonstrate greater pupillary dilation on
incongruence
benign trials
- HC group will demonstrate greater pupillary dilation
on negative trials

predictions thus assume (except hypothesis 3 where we specifically test this assumption) that the
ambiguous stimuli are generally emotionally salient and changes from this baseline reflect
greater difficulty in evaluating an interpretation.
Hypothesis 1: Groups Will Differ Behaviorally in Observed Interpretation Biases. We
hypothesize that compared to a never depressed control group, depressed individuals will
evidence automatic negative interpretation biases on the WASP-D, as indicated behaviorally by
faster reaction times and higher endorsement rates for negative interpretations in the MDD
group. In contrast, we expect that the HC group will evidence the same pattern with benign
interpretations. If confirmed, this study will provide the first evidence that automatic
interpretation biases take place in individuals suffering with major depressive disorder.
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Hypothesis 2: Pupillary Responses Indicate Presence of Interpretation Biases. In order to
be able to interpret pupillary reactivity in relationship to behavioral indicators of interpretation
biases, it is important to establish that reactivity differentiates natural interpretation processing
from biased processing. This is difficult given that theoretically, natural processing is biased in
an absolute sense and therefore must be examined relative to theorized group differences.
However, natural processing is likely to be different based on group membership, in that we
expect negative interpretation biases in the MDD group and benign interpretation biases in the
HC group (hypothesis 1). One way of establishing if pupillary reactivity is associated with
differential interpretations is to examine if dilation differs from a condition in which there is no
further stimulus to illicit a response after the ambiguous information. This sentence only
condition serves as a control condition in which natural processing of the ambiguous stimulus is
not challenged by a need to evaluate potential associations with an unambiguous word. We thus
expect consistent cognitive effort will be deployed during the processing of the sentence and
therefore that pupillary waveforms will reflect attentive processing of the information. We
predict that compared to unchallenged interpretations of the ambiguous sentence (i.e., the
sentence only condition), groups will differ on which trial types produce differing pupillary
reactivity based on theorized interpretation response patterns associated with depression (Beck,
1976; Beck & Haigh, 2014). As such, we specifically expect that the MDD group will require
greater cognitive effort to process the interpretation and hence greater dilation on trials consistent
with a benign bias (i.e., benign endorsement and negative rejection trials) compared with a
sentence only control condition.. Likewise, we specifically expect that the HC group will require
greater cognitive effort to process the interpretation and hence greater dilation on trials consistent
with a negative bias (i.e., negative endorsement and benign rejection) when compared to a
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sentence only control condition. We examined these specific contrasts in part due to recognition
that when all trial type conditions are included together, we expect to observe no difference
between at least three of the five conditions within groups. Further, because groups should not
overlap in which conditions differ from the sentence only control, it is possible that interaction
effects would be washed out by opposing directions in the group effect.
Hypothesis 3: Pupillary Responses Indicate Ambiguity is Differentially Salient for
Depressed Persons. Regarding the process of bias formation, we hypothesize that depressed
individuals will demonstrate initial pupillary reactivity during the WSAP-D in response to the
ambiguous sentence as an index of emotional salience of the ambiguous sentence. Specifically,
we expect dilation in response to the sentence to be greater in the MDD group than in the HC
group due to greater likelihood of viewing the stimulus as negative and therefore more
emotionally activating. We are thus specifically testing the emotional saliency of the ambiguous
stimulus in depression rather than taking this for granted as in our other hypotheses. We expect
greater dilation in the MDD group relative to HC due to increased likelihood of depressed
individuals making negative interpretations and experiencing a negative emotional response to
the sentence. Although there are no previous data that directly bear on this prediction, previous
work has shown greater MDD-related pupillary reactivity during emotion relevant decisionmaking tasks such as identifying the valence of masked words (Siegle et al., 2003), emotion
expression identification tasks (Laeng et al., 2013), and responding to emotionally arousing
pictures (Bradley, Miccoli, Escrig, & Lang, 2008). Together, this suggests that pupillary
reactivity may be used both as a measure of emotional decision making and cognitive control
simultaneously.
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Hypothesis 4: Group Pupillary Reactivity Will Differ Based on Semantic Incongruence.
We hypothesize that groups will differentially demonstrate pupillary reactivity based on
interpretation biases. Across the groups, we expect that pupillary reactivity will continue to
increase with the presentation of the unambiguous word such that greater dilation will be
observed when the word is incongruent with the interpretation (i.e., semantic expectation) made
by the participant regarding the meaning of the ambiguous sentence. We expect greater dilation
because of increased cognitive effort (i.e., greater task difficulty) when needing to evaluate a
potential relationship with the ambiguous stimulus when the unambiguous word does not fit the
participant’s natural bias. Although no previous data directly bear on this prediction, it is
plausible since previous work has demonstrated greater pupillary reactivity during tasks
requiring increased cognitive effort for decision making (Siegle et al., 2001) and valence
identification (Lang et al., 2013; Siegle et al., 2001). Pupillary reactivity has also been
demonstrated as sensitive to cognitive control tasks (Jones, Siegle, & Mandell, 2015). Further,
we hypothesize groups will differ on which trial types trigger extended cognitive processing as
indicated by increased dilation in response to the unambiguous words. Specifically, we expect
that compared with non-depressed individuals, depressed individuals will demonstrate continued
pupillary reactivity in response to unambiguous benign words during WSAP-D trials, possibly
due to greater cognitive effort in resolving the association. By contrast, we expect non-depressed
individuals will demonstrate the opposite pattern, with continued reactivity in response to
unambiguous negative words.
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Chapter Two:
Method

Participant Recruitment and Eligibility
Participants were recruited from the Tampa Bay area through fliers, online
advertisements, the Psychological Services Center, and University of South Florida Counseling
Center. Eligibility for the study consisted of either a primary current MDD diagnosis (i.e.,
depression that is not secondary to another disorder such as obsessive-compulsive disorder or
post-traumatic stress disorder) or having no history of a major depressive episode (although
anxiety disorders were not specifically an exclusion criteria for the healthy control group, we did
not have any individuals who met criteria for anxiety disorders who did not also experience at
least a past depressive episode). A primary MDD diagnosis was required to reduce sample
heterogeneity and increase the chances that our depressotypic stimuli were perceived as selfrelevant (see stimuli set section and appendix E; Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Matthews &
MacLeod, 2005). Individuals with current or history of serious brain injury or other neurological
illness, moderate to severe alcohol or substance use disorder (i.e., formally substance abuse or
dependence according to DSM-IV criteria) within the past six months, or a lifetime or current
diagnosis of bipolar or psychotic disorder were excluded. Treatment use and participation
information was collected for potential covariate analyses, but was not part of exclusion criteria.
Of 242 individuals who initially responded to advertisements, 148 completed a phone
screen with a research assistant. Of these, 94 were invited to the laboratory to complete the
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diagnostic interview to determine final eligibility for the study. Individuals were most commonly
excluded from the study after phone screen if they endorsed a lifetime history of manic or
psychotic symptoms (n=23), were not fluent English language speakers (n=12), endorsed past
but not current symptoms of depression (n=7), or reported high current substance use (n=7). A
total of 75 participants completed the diagnostic interview. Of these participants, 12 were
excluded according to our exclusion criteria (5 for past but not current depressive episode, 2 for
bipolar disorder diagnosis, 3 for current substance use disorder, 2 for lack of English fluency). Of
the 63 participants invited to complete the experimental session, 54 completed the full session
(see chart 1), with one individual excluded from analysis due to changes to the paradigm after
individuals in the HC group for the WSAP-D endorsement rate and reaction time analyses.
Pupillary data from four individuals in the HC group was lost due to equipment failure or
experimenter error. Thus a final sample of 25 MDD and 24 HC individuals were included in the
pupillary reactivity analyses.
Power Analyses
Our recruiting did not reach our originally proposed sample size of 35 individuals per
group (70 total). This earlier power estimate was based on our prior studies using the WSAP-D
with sub-clinical depression samples and medium to large Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1988) and partial
eta squared effect sizes (Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015;
2017; Sears, Bisson, & Nielson, 2011). Our original power analyses were conducted using
G*Power version 3.1.9.2 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, Lang, 2009) with .80 power. These power
analyses were likely conservative. First, there is evidence from other cognitive bias research that
effect sizes are similar or larger in clinically diagnosed samples relative to subclinical dysphoric
samples (Cristea, Kok, & Cuijpers, 2015; Hallion, et al., 2009). Second, studies have found
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Enrollment

Phone screening for
eligibility (n = 148)

Unable to schedule
(n = 19)

Clinical Interview
Invitation (n = 94)

Analysis

Assignment

Clinical Interview
(n = 75)

Excluded (n = 54)
Mania/Psychosis (n = 23)
Non-Fluent English (n = 12)
High Current SUD (n = 7)
Past w/o Current MDD (n = 7)

Did not meet criteria
(n = 12)
Unable to schedule
experimental session
(n = 9)
Completed inconsistent
version of task (n = 1)

Assigned to HC group
(n = 28)

Assigned to MDD group
(n = 25)

Analyzed (n = 25)

Analyzed (n = 28)

Full sample included in both
behavioral and pupillary
analyses

Full sample included in
behavioral analyses

4 pupillary data files lost to
experimenter error or
equipment failure

Chart 1: Participant Recruitment Flow Chart

effects on pupillary reactivity measures in depressed samples with samples ranging from 14
(Siegle et al., 2001; 2003) to 25 (Siegle, Steinhauer, & Thase, 2004; Steidtmann, Ingram, &
Siegle 2010) for analyses. Examination of previous studies and observed effect sizes suggests
our recruited sample was adequate to examine medium to large effects in both the behavioral and
pupillary reactivity analyses. Nevertheless, we utilized a conservative analysis approach,
particularly in the pupillary reactivity data including use of restricted maximum likelihood while
running multilevel models and testing specified contrasts to reduce the overall number of models
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run. Further, to better understand the potential role that sample size may play in detecting effects,
effect size information was reported for all comparisons.
Study Design and Procedure
The current study used a mixed within- and between-subjects design. Participants were
screened via phone interview to make a preliminary determination of eligibility. If potentially
eligible to participate, participants were invited to complete a longer in-person clinical interview
for final determination of eligibility. Eligible participants were then scheduled to complete the
experimental session on a different date. During the experimental session, they had their Smart
Eye Pro gaze calibration profile created (see SmartEye Tracker procedure below), completed
self-report questionnaires, a baseline pupillary reactivity measure, a practice version of the
WSAP-D task, and the WSAP-D task. Participants also completed paper and pencil tasks and a
delayed word recognition task for future, secondary analyses by the primary investigator (not
reported here).
Diagnostic Evaluation and Procedure
Immediately after providing written informed consent, participants completed a
diagnostic interview. Diagnostic evaluations were conducted by the primary investigator and
three trained upper-level research assistants based on DSM-5 (APA, 2013) diagnostic criteria.
The interviews consisted of the mood module (major depressive disorder, past depressive
episodes, and mania/hypomania) of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I
Disorders (SCID-I, First, Spitzer, Gibbon, et al., 2002) and all but the mood modules of the Mini
International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al, 1998) Version 7 for DSM-5,
which has been used in clinical trials (Balestri et al., 2016; Castro eta l., 2015; Day et al., 2015;
de Ornelas, et al., 2015; Linden & Rath; 2014; Shvartzman, et al., 2005). The combination of the
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SCID and MINI for diagnostic assessment was chosen to ensure thorough standardized
assessment of mood disorder symptoms (SCID) while mitigating participant burden through
faster assessment of other potential psychopathology (e.g., anxiety disorders, PTSD, psychotic
disorders). Per our experience, the average full SCID with a depressed individual with few
comorbidities is between 60-90 minutes while the average MINI is just 20-30 minutes. In the
present study, the average diagnostic interview lasted between 20-30 minutes for healthy control
participants and 30-45 minutes for depressed participants.
The primary investigator in the study had completed training to use both the SCID and
the MINI to determine individual diagnoses as well as primary diagnoses. The primary
investigator trained upper-level research assistants to complete the interviews through training
time, role playing, and listening to tapes of interviews and comparing diagnostic outcomes. After
training and during data collection, a subset of 15 interviews were submitted to a reliability
analysis by three separate individuals conducting the interviews. The primary investigator was
always either the primary interviewer or one of the interview reliability raters. Interrater
agreement on group assignment – MDD versus never depressed HC - was excellent ICC = .97
[95% CI: .93, .99].
Measures
Demographic and health questionnaire. General demographic (e.g., age, gender,
ethnicity) and health information (e.g., medication treatments, brain trauma history) was
acquired through a self-report questionnaire (appendix A). Demographics were used for sample
description and to examine whether MDD and HC groups differed on confounding factors. This
measure will also allow secondary analyses on the dataset relevant to physical health.
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Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). The
BDI-II is a well-validated 21-item scale assessing depressive symptom severity during the
previous two weeks via self-report. Scores range from 0 to 63 with higher scores representing
greater symptom severity. The BDI-II (appendix B) has well established psychometric properties
including high measure (α=.91) and test-retest (r=.93) reliability (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996).
The BDI-II was used as a continuous measure of depressive symptoms to potentially examine
depression severity effects and to further substantiate distress differences between the MDD and
HC groups. The reliability of the BDI-II in the current sample was excellent (α=.97).
Spielberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Luschene, Vagg
& Jacobs, 1983). The STAI is a 40-item scale assessing state and trait anxiety symptoms. Scores
range from 40 to 120, with higher scores indicating greater levels of anxiety. The STAI
(appendix C) has been shown to have adequate psychometric properties (Ramanaiah, Franzen, &
Schill, 1983). The STAI was used to assess anxiety levels and to further substantiate distress
differences between the MDD and HC groups. The STAI may also be used in secondary
analyses. The reliability of both the state (α=.96) and trait (α=.98) version of the STAI was
excellent in the current sample.
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule – State/Trait (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). The PANAS (appendix D) is a 22-item scale assessing positive and negative affect.
Participants rate their general (trait) and current (state) experience of single word “feeling”
descriptors (e.g., interested, distressed, anxious) on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 1 to 5, with 1
“representing very slightly or not at all” and 5 representing “extremely.” The PANAS has scores
for positive affect and for negative affect with high internal consistency. The PANAS has been
found to be a valid, reliable assessment of affective experience (Crawford & Henry, 2004). The
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PANAS provided further affective characterization of the sample. There was good reliability for
both the positive (α=.95) and negative (α=.91) subscales of the PANAS within the sample.
Word-Sentence Association Paradigm for Depression (WSAP-D)
The WSAP-D is an experimental task based on semantic association processing measures
from cognitive psychology. The WSAP-D is presented through E-Prime 2.0 professional.
Participants were seated approximately 52cm from the monitor. Stimuli were presented in black
Times New Roman 14pt font on a grey background to control for luminosity and pupillary light
reflexes. In our previous studies, WSAP-D trials began with a fixation cross in the middle of the
screen. This fixation point was then replaced by a single ambiguous sentence (e.g., “You begin a
new job.”) for 1000ms. After 1000ms, the sentence disappeared and was replaced by a single
word, which was either negative (e.g., “unqualified”) or benign (e.g., “qualified”). The word
remained on the screen until the participant indicated whether or not the word is related to the
sentence. Participants were instructed to make their response as quickly as possible. Participants
indicated the word was related to the sentence by pressing the left mouse button or that the word
was not related to the sentence by pressing the right mouse button. The next trial began
immediately after the participant responded to the word with a fixation cross in the center of the
screen. The WSAP-D was used to demonstrate evidence of automatic interpretation biases in two
separate studies completed by the primary investigator comparing dysphoric and non-dysphoric
groups (Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015). Further, a
modification of this paradigm was successful in reducing negative interpretation biases in a
sample of dysphoric individuals (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2017).
The WSAP-D used a stimuli set of 170 unique ambiguous sentences, each paired with a
negative and a benign word. Participants saw each sentence only once and paired with only one
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of the two possible words. The sentence order and word pairing was randomized for each
participant. Thus, two participants might have no overlap in the sentence-word stimulus pair that
as presented, although all participants saw the same 170 sentences. For the purposes of this
study, the WSAP-D was modified for assessment of pupillary reactivity per suggestions made by
a pupillary reactivity in depression expert and consultant, Greg Siegle, PhD. The goal of these
modifications was to isolate the different components of a WSAP-D trial (fixation, sentence,
word, and response) to differentiate pupillary responses while working as best as possible to
avoid light reflex reactions. In general, all stimuli were matched in length across trials using a
series of XX’s on either side of the words/sentence. Further, an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) was
added to all trials to assess for pupillary reactivity to the response in order to allow the pupil to
return to a baseline diameter before beginning the next trial. For 75 trials, the previously used
WSAP-D trial (as described above) was presented with the addition of a 4000ms ISI slide
consisting of a series of XXs across the screen. To assess reactivity to the ambiguous sentence
alone, 15 trials consisted of fixation, sentence, and a 5000ms ISI. These trials serve as a baseline
comparison for reactivity to the sentence without exposure to an associated word and without
requiring a response (i.e., natural processing of the ambiguous sentence). Because these trials do
not display a word stimulus, the ISI was extended by 1000ms to keep trial length as consistent as
possible with other trials in which participants provided responses. To assess reactivity effects to
the word and to eliminate possible effects of the word disappearing or of attempts to remember
the word, a second control condition consisting of 80 trials was added in which the word
remained on the screen for an additional 3000ms after the participant responded, followed by a
1000ms ISI consisting only of a series of XXs. The participant was able to see that their
behavioral response was recorded by the appearance of an asterisk under the word, indicating
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that no further response was necessary. This combination of trials allowed us to isolate the
pupillary reactivity to the sentence, to the word, and to possible continuing thoughts related to
the response made. Trial conditions were programmed with different sentences at random and
changed every eight participants to control for possible stimuli effects.
Before completing the WSAP-D task, experimenters read instructions aloud while
participants read along on the computer screen. After participants indicated they understood the
instructions, they completed a practice version of the WSAP-D. The practice version was a short
block of trials where sentences and words were neutral in content, were not self-referent, and it
was clear whether or not the word related to the sentence (e.g., sentence: The bird flapped its
wings. Word: Pickle). These trials consisted of the fixation, the sentence, the word, and the
4000ms ISI. The experimenter remained in the room during practice to answer participants’
questions and to ensure participants understood the instructions (i.e., participants were using the
mouse buttons correctly). After it was clear the participant understood the task from the practice
block, the experimenter began the experimental version of the WSAP-D and left the room. Upon
completion of the task, participants completed paper and pencil tasks followed by a delayed
word recognition task. These tasks will be used in secondary analyses and are not discussed
further for this project.
Stimuli Set. The WSAP-D stimuli set (appendix E) was composed of ambiguous
sentences paired with unambiguous and abstractly related words. Each sentence was paired with
a negative word and a benign word. All paired words were abstractly related to the sentence. A
total of 414 self-referent ambiguous sentences were created and tested by the primary
investigator while obtaining her Master’s degree at San Diego State University. Items were
created to relate either to symptoms of depression (e.g., You do not want to get out of bed;
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negative word: sad; benign word: comfortable) or based on theories of depression (e.g., People
always tell you to smile; negative word: defective; benign word: loved). The convergent and
divergent validity of each sentence was tested by correlating the word relatedness rating
difference score between the associated words (negative – benign) for the sentence with
standardized self-report measures of depression and anxiety.
At San Diego State University, 248 undergraduate students completed a short consent
form, demographics information, BDI-II, STAI, Leibowitz Social Anxiety Scale (Fresco, et al.,
2001) and Penn State Worry Questionnaire (Molina & Borkovec, 1994), and rated “how well
each word relates to the sentence” on a 4-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”.
Difference scores were calculated for each sentence such that the rating for the benign word was
subtracted from the rating for the negative word. A positive difference score reflected a negative
bias because participants indicated that the negative word was more related to the sentence than
the benign word.
The WSAP-D stimuli set was composed of sentences for which the difference score
correlated with the BDI-II above a cutoff (r=.2) or if the correlation was greater with the BDI-II
than with any anxiety measure by at least .05. This second cutoff was implemented because it
was apparent that many sentences were highly correlated with both anxiety and depressive
symptoms. A pool of 170 sentences was created based on these cutoffs to be used as stimuli in
the WSAP-D. For the full stimuli set, see appendix E.
Interpretation Bias Scores. The WSAP-D assessed automatic interpretation biases via
two distinct bias indices (endorsement rates and reaction times) based on a single behavioral
response (i.e., the participant’s decision indicated by mouse click). This response generally
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occurred within 1500ms of the presentation of the unambiguous word, indicating that the
information was processed quickly.
Endorsement rates. Endorsement rates were the proportion of each word type that the
participant endorsed as related to the sentence, out of the total number of trials in which the word
type was presented. For example, the negative endorsement rate would be the number of trials
where the person endorsed the negative word as related to the ambiguous sentence divided by the
total number of trials in which a negative word was presented. A negative endorsement rate of 0
would indicate that the participant never endorsed a negative word as related to the sentence,
while an endorsement rate of 1 would indicate that the participant always endorsed the negative
word as related to the sentence. A tendency to endorse negative words as related to the sentence
more often than benign words would be indicative of a negative interpretation bias within
individuals. Similarly, group differences in which participants suffering from MDD demonstrate
higher endorsement rates for negative words than healthy controls would be indicative of a
negative interpretation bias in depression.
Reaction times. Prior to analysis, reaction times less than 200ms, greater than 5000ms, or
greater than ± 2.5 standard deviations from the mean reaction time for each participant were
defined as outliers and excluded from analyses (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015, 2017).
This data cleaning removes trials indicative of impulsive responding (< 200ms), inattention
(>5000ms) or that differ markedly from an individual’s general reaction time tendency. We did
not restrict reaction times to a specific cut-off in order to allow for individual differences in
processing speed. One participant endorsed only one negative word as related to the sentence and
therefore this value was preserved despite it being outside the participant’s individual reaction
time tendency.
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Reaction time indices were separated into four different types of trials: (1) time to
endorse a negative word, (2) time to reject a negative word, (3) time to endorse a benign word,
and (4) time to reject a benign word. Generally, faster times to endorse negative words or reject
benign words as related to the sentence are indicative of a negative interpretation bias. Further,
slower times to reject negative words or endorse benign words as related to the sentence are also
interpreted as being indicative of a negative interpretation bias. Faster reaction times indicate that
the person had already resolved the ambiguity of the sentence in line with the semantic
association represented by the word. Thus, a faster reaction to endorse negative words indicates
that the individual had already resolved the ambiguity as negative, and therefore represents a
negative bias. Conversely, a faster reaction time to reject a negative word would indicate the
ambiguity had already been resolved as benign, and thus the negative word did not fit the
semantic association made by the individual.
Within individuals, a faster reaction time to endorse than to reject the relationship
between a negative word and the ambiguous sentence is indicative of a negative interpretation
bias. Similarly, a faster reaction time to reject than to endorse the relationship between a benign
word and the ambiguous sentence is indicative of a negative interpretation bias. Between groups,
endorsing negative words as related more quickly in the MDD group compared to the healthy
controls would be indicative of a negative interpretation bias in the MDD group. Conversely,
endorsing benign words as related more slowly in the MDD group compared to the healthy
controls would be indicative of a negative interpretation bias in the MDD group, or possibly a
benign interpretation bias in the healthy control group.
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Pupillary Reactivity: Equipment and Procedure
Smart Eye Pro Eye Tracker. Pupillary reactivity was recorded via Smart Eye Pro 6.0 on a
SmartEye DR-120 system, located in the EEG laboratory at the University of South Florida. The
Smart Eye Pro DR-120 system is capable of tracking both gaze and pupil diameter at a rate of
120Hz or every 8.3ms. Raw and processed pupil size was recorded through the system and time
locked with a computer system running E-prime software with the Smart Eye Pro E-prime
extensions installed. The E-prime extensions route the Smart Eye Pro and gaze data through Eprime into a single data file with the WSAP-D experimental data. Real time pupil diameter was
recorded and time stamped by the Smart Eye Pro 6.0 software and matched to the E-prime
stimulus through the gaze data file produced by E-prime. These files were then merged so that
files contain pupil diameter, gaze point, stimulus, and accurate stimulus/response pairing.
Participants sat as comfortable as possible in a chair in front of a computer monitor. Prior
to completing the experimental tasks, each participant had an eye-tracking profile created and
baseline of their natural pupil diameter measured for an extended period of time. The Smart Eye
DR120 was calibrated by positioning participants’ chins on a stable block while they look at five
different points on the screen and a profile of the participant’s gaze was created. The Smart Eye
Pro marked the participant’s facial features at the pupils, corners of the eyes, and upper lip to
increase eye tracking sensitivity. The profile allowed participants to complete all tasks without
recalibrating their gaze before each task and without the use of a chinstrap to restrict head
movement (Klingner, 2010). Smart Eye profiles also allowed experimenters to restart a task
without repeating the full setup when technical errors occurred.
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Data processing: Data was processed using Dr. Greg Siegle’s pupil toolkit (Siegle,
Ichikawa, & Steinhauer, 2008) which uses the procedures reported by Siegle et al. (2001; 2003),
derived from Granholm, Asarnow, Sarkin, and Dykes (1996). MatLab R2016B (MathWorks,
2016) was used to process the raw pupillary data with scripts modified with Dr. Siegle. Base
scripts are well validated and available from Dr. Siegle upon request, modifications were made
for the specific experimental needs of the study with guidance from Dr. Siegle regarding
reductions in type I error due to highly intercorrelated, closely recorded data sampling
procedures. Processing considers the experimental task timing and the rate of data recording.
Trials comprised of more than 50% blinks were removed from consideration. Trials with less
than 50% blinks have linear interpolations replacing blink related pupil dilation changes to
facilitate data smoothing with a 10-point weighted average filter. Because of how WSAP-D
stimuli are presented (black ink on a grey background where stimuli are all the same length
across the screen so that luminosity does not change throughout the experiment), we did not
encounter light reflex related noise in the data outside of a general blink response at baseline (see
pupillary dilation indices below).
Further, as suggested by Dr. Siegle due to the high level of autocorrelation in pupillary
data collected continuously overtime, data was collapsed across 2 Hz, leaving one sample every
500ms. This procedure allows an inspection of the pupillary reactivity and motility beyond the
high level of autocorrelation in the smoothed pupil waveform (Burkhouse, Siegle, & Gibb, 2014)
As we are focused on group level differences in the present project, pupil dilation means for
every 500ms throughout the trial were used for all analyses, consistent with use of mixed
multilevel modeling statistical analyses. This procedure was suggested by Dr. Siegle due to the
potential need to examine nine separate conditions based on condition type (sentence only
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control, word disappears after response [classic WSAP], and word remains on screen after
response [stimulus change control]), word valence, and participant response). Pupillary reactivity
was calculated by subtracting the mean pupil dilation from trial baseline to each epoch in the trial
(see figure 1). This procedure produced pupillary changes for each trial which can be examined
as waveforms over the course of the trial. Waveforms were then averaged for group comparisons
on specific trial types: endorse a negative association, endorse a benign association, reject a
negative association, reject a benign association and analyzed both by comparing the waveform
as a whole (Burkhouse, Siegle, & Gibb, 2014; Frazen, Buysee, Dahl, Thompson, & Siegle, 2009)
as well as comparing peak dilation points across trials (Siegle, et al., 2003). Maintaining
timestamped reactivity allows for an analysis of individual reactivity across time in each trial
through mixed method modeling using an autoregressive structure. Dr. Siegle personally worked
with the principal investigator examining her MatLab script to ensure that processing was
completed as described and that resultant pupillary data is consistent with standard observations
of pupillary reactivity data.
Pupillary dilation indices: We initially proposed to measure pupillary reactivity by
subtracting each epoch post stimulus from the last epoch pre-stimulus at each portion of the trial.
However, pupil dilation processing revealed that a number of participants began trials with a
blink. Examination revealed significant group differences at timepoint 0ms (i.e., trial start; t(403)
= 2.35, p=.019, d =1.79), suggesting that the MDD group was more likely to open their eyes
from a blink at the start of a trial. We therefore ran all pupillary analyses using reactivity as
measured by subtracting baseline pupil dilation at the beginning of each trial from each epoch.
Adjusting each epoch relative to the pre-trial baseline allowed us to examine effects within the
trials associated with specific intra-trial differences. We then examined how dilation changes are
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Figure 1: Example Pupillary WSAP-D Experimental Conditions.
Classic WSAP-D Trial = previously published stimulus sequence in WSAP trial; Sentence
Only Control Trial = control condition in which only the sentence is presented to assess
sentence only pupillary responding; Word Remains Control Trial = control condition in which
word remains on the screen after response to assess response to word presentation and
potential effects of attempting to remember the word. *Note: Text size variation in figure due
to page size, text was consistent across experimental trails for participants
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Next
trial

associated with different points in the interpretation process and identified both the peak of
dilation during the entire trial (waveform analysis) as well as when the greatest change in
dilation was observed (peak dilation analysis), providing insight into the process of interpretation
bias formation and reinterpretation.
As such, reactivity to the ambiguous sentence was calculated by subtracting the pupil
dilation from trial baseline (time point 0ms) from pupil dilation at each epoch (i.e., time points
500ms at sentence onset, 1000ms, and 1500ms at sentence offset) during sentence presentation (a
total of 3 epochs). The reactivity for the word was calculated by subtracting the baseline pupil
dilation from each epoch (i.e., time points 2000ms and 2500ms) during word presentation (an
average of 2 epochs). The reactivity for the response was calculated by subtracting dilation from
trial baseline from dilation during the first 1000ms of the interstimulus interval (i.e., time points
3000ms and 3500ms) epochs (a total of 2 epochs) because the slide switched to the interstimulus
interval when the participant provided a response. The remainder of the interstimulus interval
(i.e., time points 4000ms and 4500ms) was used to evaluate potential continued cognition
regarding decision. Thus, each trial produced an average of 10 epochs through which to examine
pupillary reactivity. A total of five seconds of each trial condition were compared due to
participant response partially determining the total time of a trial. Five seconds is present for all
conditions and includes fixation, sentence, word, response, and interstimulus interval from all
interpretation trials. These epochs formed waveforms together which were then compared across
trials both within participants and across groups.
Prior to hypothesis testing, standard WSAP trials in which the word disappeared after a
response was recorded (previously used version of task, Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012;
Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015, 2017) were compared to pupillary reactivity control
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condition trials in which the word remained on the screen after response. This control condition
was added per Dr. Siegle’s suggestion to be able to account for potential effects of changes in the
visual stimulus associated with response. Waveform comparisons between standard and control
WSAP presentations within trial types (i.e., endorse negative, endorse benign, reject negative,
reject benign) revealed no significant differences between standard and control conditions of the
WSAP (all ps > .5). As such, the standard and control conditions were collapsed into
interpretation trial types to increase power to detect effects. This suggests that secondary
analyses may be able to examine stimulus locked waveforms rather than time locked waveforms
in the future.
Waveform analysis was completed by comparing whole waveforms from trial types for
differences in amplitude and shape (Burkhouse, Gibb, & Siegle, 2014). On an individual level of
analysis, waveform analyses compare the aggregate waveform for each trial type to examine
differing pupillary responses within the individual. On a group level, individual mean waveforms
are aggregated to form group mean waveforms which are then compared by trial type to examine
differential group pupillary responses to different trial types and potentially identify different
patterns of information processing and interpretation bias. Group level analyses are the focus of
the current project, although future examination of individual differences in waveforms could be
examined in a secondary analysis with the addition of a trial number factor.
In addition to whole waveform analysis, waveforms can be examined for a peak dilation
point both across the entire waveform (i.e., greatest pupillary dilation change during the trial)
and within each segment of the trials (i.e., greatest pupillary dilation change from pre-stimulus
presentation to post-stimulus presentation). These statistical analyses can be run both with
aggregate waveforms and trial by trial waveforms, allowing for the possibility of examining
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greater individual differences and to account for learning effects as trials proceed. For the
purposes of this study, we examined the aggregate waveforms, although we acknowledge the
potential for secondary analyses examining individual differences through a trial by trial
waveform analysis through use of a trial number factor.
Peak dilation analyses compare the amplitude of dilation changes during the waveform as
a whole and during specific, stimulus bound segments of a trial. Amplitudes differ according to
the amount of cognitive effort needed in a task. As such, we expected peak dilation to occur
during and immediately after the response (i.e., time points 3000ms and 3500ms – after the word
has disappeared in the classic WSAP-D trials), as this likely required the largest cognitive effort
(i.e., the greatest amount of activity) due to organizing a decision and a button push action. We
also expected that at the waveform level of analysis, peak dilation will differ in association with
behavioral measures of interpretation biases such that when information is incongruent with
biased expectations, it will take greater cognitive effort (thereby leading to greater pupillary
reactivity amplitude) to evaluate and respond to the stimulus. At the trial segment level,
comparing peak dilation within a segment (i.e., within fixation, sentence, word, response, and ISI
segments) allows for examination of changes in pupillary dilation amplitude during the process
of interpretation biases. Thus, examining changes between segments provides insight into the
formation of a bias as well as comparison of greatest peak responding in association with
behavioral indices of interpretation biases.
Statistical Analysis
WSAP-D data cleaning and analyses were completed using SPSS statistical software
(IBM Corp., 2016). Pupil dilation was processed using the pupil Toolkit (Siegle, 2003) via
Matlab R2016B statistical software (MathWorks, 2016). Multilevel mixed effect models were
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run using the MIXED function in SPSS. Pupillary reactivity waveform graphs were created using
the ggplot2 function (Wickham, 2009) in RStudio (R Core Team, 2018). Bivariate relationships
between the WSAP-D indices and baseline relative pupillary reactivity are presented in
Appendix G.
Multivariate assumptions testing: Multilevel mixed (MLM) effects models function with
a number of assumptions. As outlined by Curran and Bauer (2014), it is important to test
underlying assumptions to improve confidence in model results. Key MLM assumptions include
mean level 1 and level 2 residuals are equal to 0, level 1 residuals and level 2 random effects are
uncorrelated with each other and with predictors, level 1 residuals and level 2 random effects are
homoscedastic and normally distributed, and finally effects are not misspecified nor are
important predictors omitted. Using the procedures outlined by Curran and Bauer (2014), we
empirically evaluated our model assumptions to the extent possible in the sample. As such, all
models have been examined for level 1 residual and level 2 random effect homoscedasticity and
normal distributions, important effects between predictors and criterions have been examined for
misspecification, and potentially important predictors have been examined prior to choosing to
omit them from a model. Of note, this procedure led us to include the quadratic time based
random effect to account for the curvilinear random normalized level 1 residuals. Inclusion of
this parameter also strengthened models across tests as well as fits with visual inspection of
pupillary waveforms. All reported models meet accepted standards for MLM assumption
adherence (Crawley, 2007; Curran & Bauer, 2014). Further, due to potentially small sample size,
all models were run using Restricted Maximum Likelihood which corrects for potential bias
related to small samples through use of an extra degree of freedom. While this may reduce
power, it increases confidence in observed model estimation and fit.
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Potential covariates: We did not expect antidepressant medication to influence our
analyses of interpretation biases in depressed individuals who remain symptomatic despite
indication that individuals treated with antidepressant medications demonstrate restored positive
cognitive biases (Harmer et al., 2009). Prior to hypothesis testing, we compared the five
individuals treated with antidepressant medications to the rest of the individuals in the MDD
group who were not treated with antidepressant medication (no healthy controls endorsed current
or past treatment with psychotropic drugs). There were no significant or observable differences
between individuals on symptoms measures, on WSAP-D reaction time and endorsement rate
indices, or on pupillary reactivity indices. We also tested medication as a statistical covariate in
all repeated measures ANOVA and mixed effected MLM models which revealed no significant
effects of medication use. Thus, medication use was not retained as a covariate during hypothesis
testing and is not considered further.
Hypothesis 1: WSAP-D interpretation biases. We expected that depressed individuals
would demonstrate a negative interpretation bias, as assessed by the reaction time and
endorsement rate indices of the WSAP-D. Group comparisons on all indices of interpretation
biases from the WSAP-D were examined through repeated measures ANOVAs. For the
endorsement rate indices, a 2 (Group: depressed vs healthy) X 2 (valence: negative vs benign)
ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor was used to examine interaction effects.
For the reaction time indices, a 2 (Group: depressed vs healthy) X 2 (valence: negative vs
benign) X 2 (response: endorse vs reject) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two
factors was used to examine interaction effects. For both indices, simple effects follow-up
analyses were conducted to decompose the specific effects driving the interaction.
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Hypothesis 2: Pupillary Responses Indicate Presence of Interpretation Biases. We
predicted that the greatest pupillary reactivity (increased dilation compared to baseline dilation
level) compared to natural, unchallenged information processing during the sentence only control
condition would occur during trials in which the behavioral response indicated a benign
interpretation (i.e., the negative rejection and benign endorsements) in the MDD group. In
contrast, for the HC group, we predicted the greatest increase in dilation to occur during trials in
which the participant’s behavior indicated a negative interpretation bias (i.e., benign rejection
and negative endorsements. We hypothesized specific contrast models to avoid type I error
inflation and account for our expectation that groups will not differ in reactivity during natural
processing and trials consistent with natural processing styles (i.e., extant biases), which would
decrease the likelihood of observing interaction effects generally.
Because we are making specific within group predictions of how interpretation biases
will relate to a measure of natural information processing, we begin analyses with examination
of models consistent with these predictions. First, we examine if groups differ on the sentence
only condition by running a mixed effects model with pupillary dilation as the dependent
measure, fixed effects of group, time, and quadratic time and random effects accounting for
participant, time, and quadratic time using an autoregressive covariance structure to account for
the high level of autocorrelation in pupillary reactivity data (Burkhouse, Siegle, & Gibb, 2014).
With no group differences in natural processing, we then examined within group differences on
trial types using a priori contrast comparison models examining the different trial types we
would expect to differ from natural interpretation processes within each group. Follow up
analyses were conducted in reverse order from usual interaction effects due to starting with
specific contrasts in our hypotheses. As such, we examined between group differences
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comparing natural processing to behaviorally indicated biased processing through the addition of
a group fixed effect to each significant within group trial type comparison. For all models, 95%
confidence intervals for each effect are reported in Appendix F.
Hypothesis 3: Pupillary Responses Indicate Ambiguity is Differentially Salient for
Depressed Persons. We expected pupil dilation in response to the sentence to be greater in the
depressed group compared to the healthy control group due to depressed individuals viewing the
ambiguous sentences as more emotionally salient. To examine this, we compared the waveforms
of the WSAP-D for group differences in peak dilation during sentence presentation.
To examine differences in dilation during sentence presentation, mixed effects multilevel
models with reactivity during the sentence as the dependent measure, random effects accounting
for participant, time, and quadratic time to account for observable curvilinear pupillary dilation
in raw data, and trial type and group as fixed effects were run with an autoregressive covariance
structure to account for the high level of autocorrelation in the pupillary reactivity data, similar to
the analyses conducted by Burkhouse, Siegle, and Gibb (2014). Follow up analyses examined
between group differences at each epoch during the sentence presentation. For all models, 95%
confidence intervals for each effect are reported in Appendix F.
Hypothesis 4: Greater Pupillary Reactivity Will be Associated with Semantic
Incongruence. Across the groups, we expected that pupillary reactivity would continue to
increase with the presentation of the word such that greater dilation would be observed when the
word is incongruent with the interpretation (i.e., semantic expectation) made by the participant
regarding the meaning of the ambiguous sentence. We predicted a group by valence by response
interaction (similar to reaction time analyses completed in hypothesis 1). Specifically, we
expected the depressed group to show greater peak dilation on trials with benign words and
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healthy controls to show greater peak dilation on trials with negative words. We compared
groups on where they demonstrated peak dilation with the expectation that dilation will begin in
response to processing the ambiguous sentence (hypothesis 3) with greater dilation related to the
behavioral response during trials reflecting group differences in biased interpretations
(hypothesis 1) consistent with observing greater dilation related to greater cognitive effort to
resolve the incongruence.
To examine this hypothesis, mixed effects models with fixed effects of Group (MDD vs
Healthy), Valence (negative vs benign), Response (endorse or reject), and Time (9 epochs across
waveform) model with pupil dilation reactivity as the dependent measures and participant, time,
and quadratic time as random effects was run with an autoregressive covariance structure. This
analysis examined differences in trial type waveforms and allows for follow-up analyses based
on interaction effects to identify specific points of difference along the waveform between
groups (Burkhouse, Siegle, & Gibb, 2014). This hypothesis examined if behavioral responses
reflect interpretation biases as assumed in our prior studies. Follow up analyses began with the
highest order significant interaction effect to examine and understand observed effects. For all
models, 95% confidence intervals for each effect are reported in Appendix F.
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Chapter Three:
Results

Participant Demographics: A total of 53 (25 MDD and 28 HC) participants completed
the experimental session. Groups did not differ on race (χ2 (3, N=53) = 1.73, p = .63), Hispanic
ethnicity (χ2 (1, N=53) = 2.09, p = .15), gender (χ2 (1, N=53) = .432, p = .51), age (t(51) = 0.07, p
=.94) or education (t(51) = -0.08, p =.94). Groups did not differ in rates of taking hormonal birth
control. Based on clinical interview, the MDD group was significantly more likely to report
suicidality (χ2 (1, N=53) = 21.31, p < .001) and at least one current anxiety disorder (MDD n=12,
HC n=1; χ2 (1, N=53) = 17.89, p < .001). The MDD group was specifically more likely to
experience a lifetime history of panic disorder (χ2 (1, N=53) = 13.81, p < .001), current panic
disorder (χ2 (1, N=52) = 9.03, p = .003), lifetime history of agoraphobia (χ2 (1, N=53) = 4.85, p =
.028), current social anxiety disorder (χ2 (1, N=53) = 4.85, p = .028), and current generalized
anxiety disorder (χ2 (1, N=53) = 10.55, p < .001). The MDD group (n=11) was more likely to
experience a traumatic event (χ2 (1, N=53) = 4.28, p = .038) than the HC group (n=5), but did not
experience PTSD more often (χ2 (1, N=53) = 1.14, p = .285) despite reporting thinking about the
event more often compared to the HC group (χ2 (1, N=53) = 7.57, p = .006). Also as expected,
the MDD group scored significantly higher on self-reported symptoms of depression (t(26.70) =
15.99, p <.001), trait anxiety (t(38.05) = 16.51, p <.001), and trait negative affect (t(32.59) =
12.265, p <.001) as well as lower trait positive affect (t(49.33) = -11.72, p <.001). Due to lack of
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variability in the HC group on these measures, reported degrees of freedom are based on unequal
variance assumptions. See Table 2 for group means and standard deviations for all demographic
information.
Table 2: Participant Demographics
Demographic
MDD Group (n=25)
HC Group (n=28)
Age (Mean, SD, Range)
21.44 (6.93, 18-51)
21.32 (5.13, 18-45)
Gender (% Female, N Female)
76.0% (19)
67.9% (19)
Education (Mean, SD, Range)
13.36 (1.35, 12-18)
13.39 (1.60, 12-18)
Race/Ethnicity
White (%, N)
80.0% (20)
75.0% (21)
Black (%, N)
12.0% (3)
7.1% (2)
Asian (%, N)
8.0% (2)
14.3% (4)
Hispanic (%, N)
24.0% (6)
42.9% (12)
Psychotropic Medications
Current (%, N)
20.0% (5)
0.0% (0)
Past (%, N)
32.0% (8)
0.0% (0)
Symptom Measure (Mean, SD,
Range)
BDI-II
30.20 (8.70, 14-48)
1.61 (2.18, 0-7)
STAI Trait
62.60 (9.05, 41-77)
28.36 (5.36, 21-45)
STAI State
53.88 (9.90, 33-70)
27.86 (6.36, 20-47)
PANAS Trait Positive Affect
19.32 (5.28, 11-29)
39.43 (7.16, 23-55)
PANAS Trait Negative Affect
31.48 (6.63, 15-45)
13.79 (3.00, 10-22)
Groups do not differ on demographic factors. Groups differed on all symptom and affect
measures, all ps < .01. BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition; STAI =
Speilberger State/Trait Anxiety Inventory; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Scale.
The MDD group was more likely to be taking psychiatric medications (χ 2 (1, N=53) =
6.183, p < .013). Five participants endorsed regularly taking psychotropic medications at the
time of the study, with three individuals regularly taking SSRI medication (Zoloft n=2, Celexa
n=1), one individual taking an SNRI (Effexor), and one individual taking Xanax as needed but
not prior to the experimental session. We did not exclude participants for medication use initially
due to expectation that medication use would not influence our results as medicated individuals
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would still meet criteria for MDD. We tested medication as a statistical covariate and found no
effect of medication use and therefore did not retain it as a covariate in subsequent analyses.
Hypothesis 1: Negative interpretation biases will be present in the MDD group. We
hypothesized that compared to a never depressed control group, depressed individuals will
evidence automatic negative interpretation biases on the WSAP-D, as indicated behaviorally by
faster reaction times and higher endorsement rates of associations between negative words and
ambiguous sentences. In contrast, the healthy control group will demonstrate benign
interpretation biases on the WSAP-D as indicated behaviorally with faster reaction times and
higher endorsement rates.
To examine endorsement rate indices of interpretation bias, we conducted a 2 (Group:
MDD vs HC) x 2 (Valence: Negative vs Benign) ANOVA with repeated measurement on the
second factor. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of valance [F(1,51) = 39.69, p <
.001; observed power = 1.0] which was modified by a Group X Valence interaction [F(1,51) =
16.80, p < .001; observed power = .98] (Figure 2). Follow up independent samples t-tests to
decompose this interaction revealed that the MDD group endorsed more associations between
negative words and ambiguous sentences than the HC group [t(51) = -3.67, p = .001, d = 1.01; CI
of difference: -0.31, -0.09]. By contrast, the MDD group endorsed fewer associations between
benign words and ambiguous sentences than the HC Group [t(51) = 2.63, p = .011, d = 0.72; CI
of difference: 0.26, 0.20]. Large effect sizes reflect group differences in both negative and benign
endorsement rate interpretation biases, in directions consistent with expected group differences
in interpretation biases.
To examine the reaction time indices, we conducted a 2 (Group: MDD vs HC) x 2
(Valence: Negative vs Benign) x 2 (Response: Endorse vs Reject) ANOVA with repeated
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measures on the last two factors. This analysis revealed significant main effects of Valence
[F(1,51) = 5.82, p < .020; observed power = .658] and Response [F(1,51) = 11.34, p = .001;
observed power = .910]. These main effects were modified by a two-way Valence X Response
interaction effect [F(1,51) = 16.85, p < .001; observed power = .981]. All lower level effects
were modified by a significant Group X Valence X Response interaction effect [F(1,51) = 5.99,
p = .018; observed power = .670].

Endorsement Rate Indices of Interpretation Bias
80
70
60
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40
30
20
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Figure 2: Endorsement rate indices of automatic interpretation biases between groups. MDD =
Major Depression Disorder Group; HC = Healthy Control Group; error bars show standard error
of the mean.
To better understand this three-way interaction and maintain consistency with our prior
studies, we conducted separate analyses within each valence. Within the benign words, a 2
(Group: MDD vs HC) X 2 (Response: Endorse vs Reject) ANOVA with repeated measures on
the second factor revealed a significant main effect of Response [F(1,51) = 29.45, p < .001;
observed power = 1.0]. However there was not a significant group by response interaction effect
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[F(1,51) = 0.70, p =.407; observed power = .13]. For negative words, a 2 (Group: MDD vs HC)
X 2 (Response: Endorse vs Reject) ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor
revealed a Group X Response interaction [F(1,51) = 7.09, p = .01; observed power = .743].
Follow-up analyses examining group differences using independent t-tests revealed a moderately
small effect size in which MDD persons were faster to endorse negative interpretations, although
this effect was not significant at a conventional p value [t(51) = 1.43, p = .160, d = 0.39; CI of
difference: -57.72, 341.57].
Because were we unable to statistically isolate the interaction effect to between group
differences, as we have done in the past, we conducted secondary follow-up analyses to examine
whether within-group differences were the source of the observed interaction effect. Follow-up
analyses examining within-group differences in reaction time indices revealed that the groups
exhibited the same reaction time pattern on the benign trials, but a different reaction time pattern
on the negative trials. Specifically, on the negative trials, the HC group was significantly faster to
reject negative interpretations than to endorse negative interpretations (mean difference = 80.96
[95% CI of difference: 40.07, -1.26]; t(27) = 2.02, p = .053, d = -0.56). By contrast, the MDD
group tended to be faster to endorse negative interpretations than to reject negative
interpretations (mean difference = -56.23 [95% CI of difference: 30.97, -120.14], t(24) = -1.82, p
= .082, d = -0.37). Both groups were significantly faster to endorse benign interpretations than to
reject benign interpretations with large effect size differences. The HC group demonstrated a
mean difference of -152.43 (95% CI of difference: -231.18, -73.68; t(27) = -3.97, p < .001, d = 0.76 ). The MDD group demonstrated a mean difference of -111.33 (95% CI of difference: 171.58, -51.09; t(24) = -3.81, p = .001, d = -0.84). Within group reaction time index differences
are shown in Figure 3. In sum, within group differences of interpretation bias patterns indicate
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that both groups show the same reaction time mean difference in the benign trials, but the
opposite pattern in the negative trials. This is consistent with our hypotheses regarding negative
biases in the depressed group and benign biases in the healthy control group.
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Figure 3: Reaction time indices of automatic interpretation biases within groups. MDD = Major
Depression Disorder Group; HC = Healthy Control Group; error bars show standard error of the
mean. * = statistical significance ≤ .05.
In summary, consistent with hypothesis, the MDD group was significantly more likely
than the healthy controls to endorse negative interpretations and significantly less likely to
endorse benign interpretations as indicated by the endorsement rate indices. Our hypothesis was
supported overall in the reaction time bias indices in that there was a significant group by
valence by response interaction which was driven by within group differences in reaction times
to endorse versus reject interpretations in the two valence conditions. Although not statistically
significant, there was moderate effect size group differences when endorsing negative
interpretations, consistent with our hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Pupillary Responses Indicate Presence of Interpretation Biases. To
establish the presence of differential pupillary reactivity based on interpretation biases, we
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compared the average waveform from the sentence only control condition, in which participants
were not asked to evaluate a relationship between the ambiguous sentence and a word (i.e., were
allowed time to process the sentence naturally) with a priori specific contrasts based on extant
interpretation biases within groups. As such, within group comparisons of WSAP-D
interpretation trial types which differ from extant biases, that is – benign biases in the MDD
group and negative biases in the HC group, were compared to the sentence only control
condition.
Although we hypothesized specific within group contrasts for analysis based on
interpretation bias differences to avoid running four separate large models examining each
condition type (thereby increasing Type I error and chance of spurious results), we report the
overall MLM model in line with standard reporting procedures. As such, we first conducted a
mixed effects MLM model with 5 (condition: sentence only, benign endorse, benign reject,
negative endorse, negative reject) X 2 (Group: MDD, HC) X 9 (time: sampled every 500ms) X 9
(quadratic time: sampled every 500ms) fixed effects with time, quadratic time, and participant as
random effects and pupillary reactivity across the entire trial as the dependent variable. As
presented in Table 1 of Appendix F, there were no significant interaction effects (all ps > 0.14).
We next examined group differences on the sentence only control condition to establish no
pupillary reactivity differences in natural information processing. We conducted a mixed effects
MLM model with 2 (Group: MDD, HC) X 9 (time: sampled every 500ms) X 9 (quadratic time:
sampled every 500ms) fixed effects with time, quadratic time, and participant as random effects
and pupillary reactivity across the sentence only condition as the dependent variable. As
expected, there were no group differences in pupillary reactivity when naturally processing
information as demonstrated by non-significant Group*Time interaction (F(1,121.61) = 0.13,
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p=.714) and Group effects (F(1,320.00) = 2.41, p=.122; full model presented in Table 2 of
Appendix F). After establishing no group differences in pupillary reactivity during natural
information processing, we continue to run our specific contrast models within groups.
To examine potential differences in pupillary reactivity waveforms within the MDD
group, we conducted a mixed effects MLM model with 5 (condition: sentence only, benign
endorse, benign reject, negative endorse, negative reject) X 9 (time: sampled every 500ms) X 9
(quadratic time: sampled every 500ms) fixed effects with time, quadratic time, and participant as
random effects and pupillary reactivity across the entire trial as the dependent variable. As
presented in Table 3 of Appendix F, this model indicated significant fixed effects of condition
(F(1,1785.05) = 5.23, p=.022) and time (F(1,53.99) = 6.40, p=.014). Examination of a priori trial
type comparisons revealed no significant difference between sentence only and benign
endorsement conditions in the MDD group, indicating that the MDD group did not demonstrate
significantly greater pupillary dilation when endorsing a benign sentence, compared to
processing the sentence alone. However, consistent with our hypothesis, examination of a priori
trial comparisons between the sentence only and the negative rejection conditions revealed a
significant condition effect (F(1,560.11) = 9.96, p=.002; β = 0.05), indicating greater pupillary
dilation during negative interpretation rejection trials. Thus reactivity differs significantly when
the MDD group behaviorally rejects a negative association between an ambiguous sentence and
an unambiguous word (Figure 4).
While rejecting a negative interpretation is consistent with our hypotheses, this may
indicate that greater dilation reflects greater effort in overcoming the initial interpretation or that
rejected negative interpretations are more emotionally engaging; it raises the possibility that we
will observe greater pupil dilation when MDDs reject any association. To examine this, we ran a
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comparison within the MDD group between the sentence only condition and the benign rejection
condition. Easy rejection of benign interpretations is an MDD-related negative interpretation
bias. As such, we would not expect to see greater cognitive effort, as indicated by pupillary

Figure 4: Depressed Group Comparison of Negative Rejection Trials and Sentence Only Control
Condition. 95% Confidence interval bands surround predicted lines. Baseline Relative Dilation =
Pupil dilation at each time point during trial – Pupil dilation at trial baseline. Whole trials are
presented and compared for each condition.
dilation, during such trials due to consistency with extant processing biases. The comparison
model revealed that condition is not a significant effect (F(1,558.24) = 0.49, p=.484) and that
there is no difference between ambiguous sentence processing alone and rejecting a benign
interpretation of an ambiguous sentence. See Table 3 of Appendix F for full model statistics for
each comparison model run within the MDD group.
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We repeated these analyses within the HC group substituting trial types which are
inconsistent with extant benign biases in these analyses. As presented in Table 4 of Appendix F,
there was no significant condition fixed effect (F(1,1709.95) = 1.02, p=.314) in the HC group.
Similar non-significant effects were found in the specific comparison between the sentence only
condition and the negative endorsement condition (F(1,524.22) = 1.29, p=.256). However, the
specific comparison between the sentence only condition and the benign rejection condition
revealed a significant effect of condition (F(1,534.89) = 8.53, p=.004; Figure 5) in which there
was significantly less dilation in response to the benign rejection compared to the sentence only
control. As with the analyses within the MDD group, we examined potential condition

Figure 5: Healthy Control Group Comparison of Benign Rejection Trials and Sentence Only
Control Condition. 95% Confidence interval bands surround predicted lines. Baseline Relative
Dilation = Pupil dilation at each time point during trial – Pupil dilation at trial baseline.
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differences between the sentence only condition and the negative rejection condition to address
potential effects related to rejecting an association in general. Similar to the pattern found within
the MDD group, there was not a significant effect of condition (F(1,536.07) = 1.18, p=.279),
suggesting no difference in pupillary reactivity when comparing a sentence only condition and a
benign interpretation consistent with extant interpretation biases.
Based on these findings, we conducted follow-up analyses comparing the sentence only
control with benign rejection and negative rejection conditions, respectively, between groups
through the addition of a group effect to each model.. Because these follow-up comparisons were
post-hoc, to reduce the chance of Type I error we only considered effects with p-values at or less
than .01 as significant. For the follow-up negative rejection compared to sentence only control
model, results demonstrate a significant group*condition interaction effect (F(1,1097.44) =
9.016, p=.003) which moderates significant group (F(1,11.92.26) = 5.988, p=.015), condition
(F(1,1097.44) = 11.138, p=.001), and time (F(1,191.47) = 10.13, p=.002) main effects (Table 5
in Appendix F). This suggests that group pupillary reactivity when rejecting a negative
interpretation differs significantly from natural processing, with greater differences in waveform
found in the MDD group, potentially suggesting a departure from extant information processing
biases. The HC group demonstrated no difference in pupillary reactivity when rejecting a
negative interpretation, suggesting consistency with extant information processing biases.
Examination of potential group differences in benign rejection trials revealed a trending
Group*Condition interaction effect (F(1,1093.70) = 2.82, p=.093) and a traditionally significant
(but not after post-hoc correction) main effect of time (F(1,162.42) = 4.88, p=.029; Table 6 of
Appendix F). This suggests that the HC and MDD groups do not differ overall in pupillary
reactivity when rejecting a benign interpretation in comparison to natural information processing.
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Although the HC group demonstrated a significant difference in this comparison as specifically
hypothesized.
In summary, our examination of pupillary reactivity as a measure of differential
information processing revealed that compared to natural information processing via a sentence
only control condition, groups demonstrated differing pupillary reactivity when interpretations
were incongruent with natural processing. In line with our specific contrast hypotheses, the
MDD group demonstrated this departure when rejecting a negative interpretation but did not
demonstrate a difference when endorsing a benign interpretation. Within the HC group,
reactivity was differential when rejecting a benign interpretation but not when endorsing a
negative interpretation. Follow-up models examining group differences in the comparison of
natural processing to each rejection based trial type revealed significant group effects when
rejecting a negative interpretation, with only a trending difference when rejecting a benign
interpretation. Taken together, this suggests pupillary reactivity may be able differentiate biased
interpretation processing within groups based on behaviorally defined interpretation conditions
with some indication of group differences from follow up models.
Hypothesis 3: Pupillary Responses Indicate Ambiguity is Differentially Salient for
Depressed Persons. We hypothesized that dilation in response to the sentence would be greater
in the MDD group compared to the HC group, reasoning that depressed individuals would view
ambiguous sentences as more emotionally salient. First, we conducted a mixed effects MLM
model with 5 (condition: sentence only, benign endorse, benign reject, negative endorse,
negative reject) X 2 (Group: MDD, HC) X 3 (time: sampled every 500ms) X 3 (quadratic time:
sampled every 500ms) as fixed effects and time, quadratic time, and participant as random
effects with pupillary reactivity to the sentence as the dependent variable. Full model results are
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presented in Table 7 of Appendix F. The interaction effect was non-significant, leading us to
drop the effect and rerun the model. After dropping this parameter, we observed fixed effects of
group (F(1,88.186) = 4.00, p=.049) and time (F(1,1201.566) = 7.17, p=.008), and a marginally
significant effect of quadratic time (F(1,197.31) = 3.67, p=.057). Condition did not affect model
fit (p=.414), suggesting that pupillary reactivity to the ambiguous sentence differed by group but
was not affected by which stimuli or response followed the ambiguous sentence.
Post-hoc comparisons to follow up on the group effect revealed unexpectedly that the
MDD group’s pupils constricted by .05mm more than the HC group’s pupils when the sentence
initially appeared on the screen (t(369.31) = -2.73, p=.007, d=.27) (Figure 6). Groups did not
differ and effect sizes were smaller for the middle (d=.12) and end (d=.03) of sentence
presentation. This raises the possibility that initial group differences reflect differential reactivity
to changing stimuli rather than a specific reaction to the sentence. However, if this were the case,

Baseline Relative Pupillary Reactivity
(mm)

Pupillary Reactivity during Initial Sentence Presentation
0

-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
-0.1
-0.12
MDD

HC

Figure 6: Mean pupillary reactivity to sentence appearance on the screen between groups. MDD
= Major Depression Disorder Group; HC = Healthy Control Group.
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we would expect to see a difference at the end of the sentence presentation, when the sentence
stimulus is replaced by the word stimulus, which is the smallest effect.
In summary, our examination of pupillary reactivity related to the ambiguous sentence
revealed group differences in pupillary reactivity to the sentence during initial processing.
Counter to our hypothesis, the MDD group displayed greater pupillary constriction in response to
the sentence than the HC group.
Hypothesis 4: Greater Pupillary Reactivity Will be Associated with Semantic
Incongruence. We hypothesized that pupillary dilation would be greatest when the word was
incongruent with the interpretation (i.e., semantic expectation) made by the participant regarding
the meaning of the ambiguous sentence. Specifically, we hypothesized that the groups would
differ on which trials they showed the greatest pupillary reactivity consistent with WSAP-D
indices of interpretation biases such that the depressed group would show greater peak dilation
on trials with benign words and healthy controls would show greater peak dilation on trials with
negative words. First, we conducted a mixed effects MLM model with 2 (Group: MDD vs
Healthy) X 2 (Valence: negative vs benign) X 2 (Response: endorse or reject) X 9 (Time:
sampled every 500ms) X 9 (Time squared: sampled every 500ms) as fixed effects and
participant, time, and quadratic time as random effects with pupil dilation reactivity as the
dependent measure. There was no significant three-way interaction between
Group*Response*Valence (F(1,3091.70) = 0.85, p=.357; β=0.026, 95% CI[-0.0298, 0.0826]).
This parameter was removed and the model rerun. A likelihood ratio test (LRT) revealed
significantly better model fit (χ2(1) = 4.42, p=.036) following removal of the three-way
interaction effect. Further model refinement led to exclusion of the non-significant
Group*Response (F(1,3092.70) = 1.12, p=.289; β=-0.015, 95% CI[-0.0433, 0.0129]) interaction
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effect with a LRT supporting increased model fit after exclusion of this parameter (χ2(1) = 5.53,
p<.019). Our final model resulted in significant Group*Valence (F(1,3093.70) = 6.91, p=.009)
and Valence*Response (F(1,3093.70) = 5.12, p=.024) interaction effects moderating significant
Response (F(1,3093.70) = 9.29, p=.002), Group (F(1,416.09) = 6.95, p=.009), and Time
(F(1,117.25) = 10.76, p=.001) main effects. See Table 8 in Appendix F for the full model
guiding follow-up comparisons.
Proceeding from the best fitting model, follow-up analyses examined the significant
Group*Valence interaction effect (F(1,3093.70) = 6.91, p=.009; β=-0.038, 95% CI[-0.0657,
0.0096]) within each Response type (endorse or reject) separately. As shown in Table 9 of
Appendix F, all model effects were significant within the endorsement trials, including the
Group*Valence interaction effect (F(1,1478.30) = 11.09, p=.001; β= -0.051, 95% CI[-0.0808,
0.0209]). We further decomposed this interaction by examining the effect of Group within each
Valence, where group remained a significant effect in benign endorsement trials (F(1,247.15) =
4.87, p=.028; β= 0.100, 95% CI [0.0107, 0.1889]) but not the negative endorsement trials
(F(1,240.92) = 1.86, p=.174; β= 0.054, 95% CI [-0.0238, 0.1311]). Follow-up examination of
group differences in pupillary reactivity on benign endorsement trials (Figure 7) using
independent sample t-tests revealed a trend towards significant differences between groups at
four timepoints along the wavelength: initial sentence presentation (graph timepoint 0.5; t(64.70)
= -1.83, p=.071, d=.39), response (graph timepoint 3.5; t(66.47) = -1.39, p=.170, d=.29), 500ms
after the response (graph timepoint 4.0; t(68.345) = -1.43, p=.157, d=.29), and 1000ms after the
response (graph timepoint 4.5; t(67.31) = -1.55, p=.126, d=.32). Although small, consistent effect
sizes suggest that the groups differ in pupillary reactivity during and after their endorsement of a
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benign interpretation with the HC group showing greater dilation in relationship to their response
compared to the MDD group.

Figure 7: Group Comparisons on Benign Endorsement Trials. 95% Confidence interval bands
surround predicted lines. MDD = Major Depression Disorder Group; HC = Healthy Control
Group. Baseline Relative Dilation = Pupil dilation at each time point during trial – Pupil dilation
at trial baseline
Analyses within the rejection response type followed a different pattern in that the
Group*Valence interaction effect was not significant (F(1,1501.25) = 1.08, p=.298; β= -0.024,
95% CI [-0.0706, 0.0216]). See Table 10 of Appendix F for model effects. Further examination
of group effects within separate valence conditions revealed no significant effects of group on
either negative rejection (F(1,234.21) = 0.04, p=.836; β= 0.009, 95% CI [-0.0749, 0.0926]) or
benign rejection (F(1,221.26) = 0.28, p=.597; β= 0.031, 95% CI [-0.0856, 0.1486]) trials. This
suggests that valence is the driving effect of differences in pupillary reactivity in trials in which
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the association between the word and the sentence were rejected, and that the pupillary reactivity
pattern is not due to group differences in interpretation biases when rejecting an association.
In summary, we were able to specify a model which fit the pupillary reactivity
waveforms observed in our sample while they completed an automatic interpretation bias
assessment task. Group differences were observed in this model, with follow-up analyses
suggesting that the MDD group displayed less pupillary reactivity during benign endorsement
(i.e., benign interpretation) trials compared to the HC group. Notably, there was no difference
found between groups on the rejection based trials.
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Chapter Four:
Discussion

The present study sought to examine automatic interpretation biases in depression. We
expanded upon previous work by assessing interpretation biases in a clinically defined sample of
depressed individuals, who were compared with never depressed healthy controls. We further
attempted to gain insight into the process of interpretation biases through the simultaneous
assessment of pupillary reactivity during interpretation bias assessment.
We found evidence of automatic negative interpretation biases in the MDD group such
that they were both more likely and faster to endorse negative interpretations compared to the
HC group. The MDD group was also significantly less likely to endorse benign interpretations
compared with the HC group. We were able to demonstrate significant reaction time differences
within groups when comparing responses to both negative and benign interpretations in the HC
group. In contrast, the MDD group differed significantly within the benign valence but did not
reach statistical difference in the negative trials, although there was a moderate effect size
difference between endorsing and rejecting negative interpretations (d = 0.37). Although low
power may have constrained our ability to detect between group reaction time differences,
examination of effect sizes revealed a moderate effect size (d=.39) mean difference between the
MDD and HC group when comparing negative endorsement trials. Notably, this effect size is
consistent with our previously reported effect sizes examining automatic negative interpretation
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biases in dysphoric undergraduate samples (Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012; Cowden Hindash &
Rottenberg, 2015). The congruent effect sizes across multiple studies suggests a consistent
difference in interpretation biases across three distinct depressive samples, with the largest
differences demonstrated in the clinically depressed group overall, although not statistically
significant at the reaction time group difference level. We thus demonstrated differences both
between and within groups in rates of negative and benign biases and speed at which biases are
indicated. This is the first study to report automatic interpretation biases in a clinically defined
depressed sample through two indices of automatic interpretation biases.
The second hypothesis concerning differential waveforms between a sentence only
control condition and responses which reflect a challenge to extant automatic interpretation
biases was not fully confirmed. This analysis acted both as a validity check that pupillary
reactivity can assess online cognitive processing while differentiating between conditions and
provides an initial examination of within group pupillary differences based on behaviorally
defined interpretation bias conditions. The results suggest that on trials in which a response
rejected theory consistent automatic bias, there was greater dilation in the MDD group but
decreased dilation in the HC group. Specifically, in the MDD group, greater dilation was
observed when negative associations were rejected, while in the HC group decreased dilation
was observed when benign associations were rejected. In both groups, trials in which rejection
was consistent with theorized extant interpretation biases (i.e., rejecting benign interpretations in
the MDD group and rejecting negative interpretations in the HC group) did not differ
significantly from the sentence only control condition. This would suggest that pupillary
reactivity can differentiate interpretation bias conditions from a natural processing control
condition. Greater effort to reject extant biases may be preliminary evidence of reinterpretation
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in the MDD group, although this effect is more difficult to interpret in the HC group, as it is in
the opposite direction. Lack of pupillary reactivity differences between endorsing an
interpretation and natural processing would suggest that endorsed biases are in line with natural
processing – thereby not requiring increased effort to evaluate and decide on a relationship.
However increased pupillary dilation during natural processing may suggest the HC group was
less engaged with benign interpretations which were rejected than when naturally processing
information. As such, this suggests that when pairing our behavioral data and the pupillary
reactivity, we may be able to examine differences in biased processing. The pattern suggested
from these analyses is that greater dilation may reflect cognitive effort or emotional engagement
at the same time, depending on the comparison at play. Greater cognitive effort relative to
natural information processing when rejecting an interpretation which fits theory consistent,
extant automatic interpretation biases would increase pupillary dilation. Decreased engagement
with benign material which does not fit an expectation may be evidence of lack of self-relevant
fit or could reflect lack of emotional engagement with the stimuli. Regardless, this implies that
automatic biases occur rapidly and pupillary reactivity may be able to provide signs of
processing during bias formation and differentiate responses which reflect reinterpretation – via
evidence of greater cognitive effort after response from trials which may reflect lack of
engagement during stimulus processing.
It is important to note that trials which were consistent with interpretation biases did not
differ from a sentence only control condition which did not require participants to consider
alternative interpretations or associations or provide any behavioral response. Similarity between
the sentence only control condition and specific, response defined trials indicates that trials in
which responding was consistent with automatic biases did not induce greater pupillary
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reactivity, because both cognitive effort and emotional saliency were consistent between
unchallenged interpretations of ambiguous material and semantically congruent interpretations.
As such, it appears that pupillary reactivity is able to map cognitive effort and saliency over the
course of interpretation processes, including examining different points of processing over the
course of an assessment trial. However, pupillary reactivity may not be able to specifically
differentiate automatic biases from natural processing – at least at the group level. This is
consistent with the behavioral data which observed that regardless of psychiatric status,
individuals demonstrate both negative and benign biases – differing in gradients of frequency
and speed rather than lacking one type of bias completely. As we cannot observe unbiased
interpretations in an absolute sense, comparative processing can provide insight into automatic
processes. This is consistent with cognitive theories of depression, which posit rapid, automatic
and negatively biased interpretations are more easily accessed than alternatives during depressive
episodes and thereby have greater influence on the individual’s perception of themselves, the
world, and the future (Beck, 1979, Beevers, 2005).
Our third hypothesis was not supported in that we observed differential pupillary
responses to the ambiguous sentence in the direction opposite to what we predicted during group
comparisons. We expected to observe greater pupillary reactivity (i.e., increased pupil dilation)
in the MDD group indicative of greater salience of ambiguous material indirectly due to greater
likelihood of negative interpretation and consistent with negative emotionality. However, counter
to our predicted direction, there was greater pupillary constriction in response to the ambiguous
sentence. This may suggest that the MDD group was less emotionally engaged with the
ambiguous information, potentially due to less disposition to see the information as ambiguous –
regardless of later interpretations made. This could reflect a comparatively general decreased
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level of engagement overall in the task consistent with hedonic deficits (Berenbaum & Oltmanns,
1992). Conversely, there is evidence of generally increased resting state neural activity in
depression (Korgaonkar, Fornito, Williams, & Grieve, 2014) which we would expect to be
associated with greater pupillary dilation (Critchley, Tang, Glaser, Butterworth, & Dolan, 2005;
Siegle, Steinhouer, Stenger, Konecky, & Carter, 2003; Siegle, Steinhauer, Thase, Stenger, &
Carter, 2002). Thus, it is possible that the observed pupillary constriction reflects the MDD
group having greater difficulty focusing their attention on the sentence relative to ongoing
background cognition. Constriction would also be consistent with an accommodation reflex
which occurs during visual refocusing on new stimuli (Beatty & Lucero-Wagoner, 2000).
Further study with replication will be necessary to fully understand this effect, perhaps with
longer inter-stimulus intervals between trials to allow for a greater comparison between potential
ongoing cognition (Siegle et al., 2015) and reorienting processes.
Finally, our fourth hypothesis that pupillary reactivity would differ between groups based
on interpretation bias was largely supported. Hypothesis four examined trial type waveform
differences between groups with an expectation that group waveforms would differ based on
interpretation type. These models, constructed in a manner similar to the repeated measures
ANOVAs run in the behavioral reaction time data, supported differential pupillary reactivity
based on trial type. While we did not observe group differences in the rejection based trials, we
found that groups differed significantly in their pupillary activity while endorsing benign
associations. In particular, the MDD group demonstrated less pupillary reactivity when
endorsing benign interpretations than the HC group. Given that in both groups, benign
endorsement trials did not differ from the sentence only condition (as tested in hypothesis two)
and therefore did not require greater cognitive effort on the part of either group to resolve, the
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observed group difference may be indicative of differential emotional saliency of the benign
interpretations. Specifically, the HC group may have found the benign trials more emotionally
salient than the MDD group, consistent with theories of automatic interpretation biases.
Importantly, our use of pupillary reactivity as the outcome measure controls for potential
baseline differences in pupillary dilation between groups. Our analyses compared changes from
baseline across the entirety of the trials and thus reflect changes relative to stimuli and response
while accounting for potential baseline differences in dilation. As such, this may further provide
evidence of hedonic deficits in depression (Berenbaum & Oltmanns, 1992) consistent with
anhedonia symptomatology and perhaps reflecting a reduced likelihood of benefitting from
positive information (Fletcher et al., 2015; Pizzagalli et al., 2008).
When we consider our hypotheses together, we find a pattern of pupillary reactivity
suggestive of both automatic interpretation biases and reinterpretation processes. First, our
observations relative to our third hypothesis suggest differential engagement initially with
ambiguous information between the MDD and HC groups, with the MDD group demonstrating
greater initial pupillary constriction, perhaps indicating decreased engagement or saliency of the
ambiguous sentence or a shift in focus towards the sentence and away from internal thoughts.
While our observations relative to our fourth hypothesis suggest differential engagement during
and after responses indicative of a benign interpretation bias, such that the MDD group
demonstrated less pupil dilation than the HC group – reflecting a lower level of engagement.
Pupillary reflexes have been found to indicate attentional processes (Kang, Huffer, & Wheatley,
2014; Wahn, Ferris, Hairston, & König, 2016), suggesting that in general, the MDD group may
have been less engaged with benign interpretations. Decreased engagement may also account for
a tendency to benefit less from making benign interpretations, consistent with hedonic deficits
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previously observed in depressed samples (Fletcher et al., 2015; Pizzagalli et al., 2008) and
associated with a worse course of depression overall (Rottenberg, Kasch, Gross, & Gotlib, 2002).
This is consistent with clinical observations in which individuals with MDD often can make
benign or even positive interpretations of events, but are unlikely to emotionally engage with (or
believe) these interpretations.
Notably, group differences in rates of benign endorsement rates suggest the MDD group
makes fewer benign interpretations, while reaction time indices suggest that the MDD group is
comparable with the HC group in terms of how quickly they make benign interpretations. Thus,
the driving difference between the groups behaviorally is how often they make benign
interpretations. Simultaneously, pupillary reactivity suggests that during automatic benign
interpretations, both groups demonstrate comparable reactivity as to when ambiguity is
unchallenged (i.e., there is no need to assess if an unambiguous word relates to the sentence).
Yet, reactivity in the MDD group was smaller overall when compared with the HC group. This
implies that while the MDD group can and does make benign interpretations of ambiguous
information, the emotional appeal of these interpretations may be weaker than that experienced
in the HC group, even when fitting with the expectations of the MDD group.
In summary, this was the first study which examined automatic interpretation biases in
major depression using an experimental paradigm while simultaneously collecting pupillary
reactivity during bias assessment. As such, there was some question as to how pupillary
reactivity would map onto the process of interpretation biases. Our initial hope was that we
would be able to map the process of automatic interpretation bias formation. We found
behavioral evidence of automatic negative interpretation biases in depression, which differed in
rate and speed of response compared to healthy controls whom favored benign biases. We
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further found that while pupillary reactivity did not provide direct evidence of automatic
interpretation biases, there is potential evidence of reinterpretation processes as indexed by
pupillary reactivity differences from a natural, unchallenged processing condition. Greater
pupillary constriction in response to the initial presentation of the ambiguous sentence could
reflect a shift in focus or decreased engagement with the standardized stimuli presented in the
WSAP-D. We further found potential evidence of hedonic deficits in depression through
decreased engagement with benign interpretations. As this is the first study to examine
interpretation biases in conjunction with pupillary reactivity, replication is necessary to increase
certainty in results and their implications. Nonetheless, there are a number of theoretical
implications based on the results of the study.
Theoretical Implications
There are a few possible implications of the relationship between the behavioral
indicators of interpretation biases and the neurophysiological indices. First, within group trial
type comparisons provide further evidence for cognitive theories of depression, particularly in
terms of automatic interpretation biases. Specifically, cognitive theories of depression indicate
that negative biases are automatic, low effort cognitive processes. This is consistent with the
results from sentence only control condition comparisons where waveform differences were only
found when usual response styles were rejected. This difference suggests that greater effort is
required to reject an extant bias, implying the presence of the bias initially.
Second, we did not see evidence of either mood congruency or response bias effects
despite significant baseline group differences in depression, anxiety, and both positive and
negative affect. Were mood congruency at play, we would expect to see a pattern of greater
dilation in response to benign words in the HC group and negative words in the MDD group
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regardless of interpretation response. However, there were no group differences apparent during
the word presentation prior to participant response and no Valence*Group effect present when
comparing trials with behavioral markers of interpretation to the sentence only, natural
processing control condition. Were response biases at play, we would expect to see little to no
variability in the types of interpretations observed behaviorally with pupillary reactivity apparent
only during the word presentation and specific types of responses. As part of testing hypothesis
two, we found no rejection based pupillary effects, instead demonstrating theory consistent
greater effort to reject extant biases. The greatest group differences in the pupillary waveform
occurred at the beginning of sentence presentation and during and after providing a response
indicative of a benign interpretation. This pattern in the pupillary data is consistent with
previously reported pupillary response data in which reactivity reflects continued cognitive
processing of emotionally relevant information after making a decision regarding a stimulus
rather than based on valence alone (Burkhouse, Siegle, & Gibb, 2014; Siegle, et al., 2003; van
der Wel & van Steenbergen, 2018). Further, lack of reactivity related to specific word valence or
response type both within the groups compared to a control condition and between groups
suggests that rather than generalized emotional reactivity to negative or benign stimuli or
generalized responding, responses may be more individually relevant based on pre-existing
interpretation biases driven by schemas rather than specifically driven by stimuli characteristics
alone. This is consistent with numerous studies which find that self-relevance is central to the
expression of depressive biases (Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015; Wisco, 2009) and that a
variety of interpretations are observable regardless of psychological status (Cowden Hindash &
Amir, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015).
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Third, the pattern of group differences in reactivity to benign interpretations is consistent
with hedonic deficits in depression. Across studies of interpretation bias, individuals with MDD
or subthreshold depression have demonstrated a consistent lack of positive bias (Cowden
Hindash & Amir, 2012; Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015; Sears, Bisson, & Neilsen, 2011;
see Mathews & MacLeod, 2005, & Wisco, 2009 for reviews). Our behavioral data adds to this
pattern in the literature in that the MDD group endorsed significantly fewer benign
interpretations compared to the HC group. Further, pupillary reactivity differences were most
prominent in the benign interpretation endorsement condition, with a pattern indicative of less
engagement with the benign stimulus in the depressed group – even while endorsing a
relationship. This could be indicative of less emotional engagement with the benign
interpretation and therefore less benefit from making the benign interpretation.
Interestingly, the reaction time indices of the WSAP-D demonstrate a difference in speed
to endorse negative interpretations in which the MDD group is nearly 200ms faster to endorse a
negative interpretation than the HC group. This group difference has been consistently found
across samples (Cowden Hindash & Amir, 2012, Cowden Hindash & Rottenberg, 2015),
however there were no significant pupillary reactivity differences consistent with this behavioral
finding, indeed pupillary reactivity was correlated with endorsement rates rather than reaction
times (see Appendix G). One potential issue which may influence our results is that the HC
group made significantly fewer (> 25%) negative interpretations compared with the MDD group.
Notably, one HC participant endorsed only one negative interpretation – meaning this
individual’s negative endorsement rate was 1%, and their reaction time and pupillary reactivity
waveform consisted of a single trial rather than an average of many trials. As the pupillary
reactivity indices have smaller effects inside of larger models, it is possible that group
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differences consistent with negative interpretation biases observed in the behavioral data were
underpowered in the pupillary data.
Mapping Interpretation Biases
It was our prediction that pupillary reactivity would map onto the process of
interpretation bias formation. This prediction stemmed from previous work which found
evidence of differential reactivity during early stages of decision making, including masked
valence identification tasks (Siegle et al., 2003). Further, evidence which suggested emotional
saliency was integral to observing pupillary reactivity (Siegle et al., 2004; Siegle et al., 2015)
suggested that reactivity would be greatest when information was emotionally relevant and a
decision needed to be made quickly. This fit our conceptualization of automatic interpretation
biases as self-relevant and negative when the individual is experiencing depression. However as
this was the first study to examine these indices together, this was not a certainty. It is possible
that pupillary reactivity may not be able to directly detect differential automatic interpretation
biases precisely because automatic biases are the natural course of information processing.
Rather, pupillary reactivity was more indicative of reinterpretation processes (which greater
effort was needed to make an interpretation) or emotional engagement with the stimuli. Our
waveform difference analyses in both the within group trial type comparisons with a sentence
only control condition and the between group trial type comparisons suggest pupillary reactivity
did not differentiate trial types during early stages of ambiguous stimulus processing, although
overall groups differed in their reactivity to the initial presentation of the ambiguous sentence.
Examination of where waveforms differed during trials indicated that pupillary reactivity was
greatest when responses were counter to theorized automatic biases. Therefore, pupillary
reactivity may be a better measure of continued information processing - as previously
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demonstrated in studies of rumination (Siegle et al, 2003, 2004) – or of semantic incongruence
effects than a direct index of immediate biases. As a measure of semantic incongruence effects,
we would expect pupillary reactivity to correlate with the late positive potential (LPP) in eventrelated potential studies (Cuthbert, Schupp, Bradley, Birbaumer, & Lang, 2000; Foti, Hajcak, &
Dien, 2009; Hajcak, MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010). As such, use of pupillary reactivity during the
WSAP-D may reflect neurological activity consistent with cognitive control (Breakelaar, et al.,
2017) and default node (Korgaonkar, Fornito, Williams, & Grieve, 2014) networks rather than
associated with the saliency network (Mennon, 2015). This is consistent with fMRI research
which has consistently demonstrated depression linked activity differences in both the cognitive
control and default node networks when compared to healthy, non-depressed individuals
(Breakelaar, et al., 2017).
Future Directions
The benefit of identifying trials indicative of reinterpretation should not be overlooked, as
reinterpretation is one of the foundations of cognitive therapies. Specifically, cognitive therapies
focus on evaluating automatic thoughts for biases which feed the vicious cycle of depression
(Beck, 1976) and then teach depressed individuals to reinterpret situations in a more benign
manner. Cognitive therapies work to increase the interaction between elaborative and automatic
processing to increase access to less negative alternatives (Beevers, 2005). A measure of real
time reinterpretation processes may be clinically useful as an assessment tool in clinical and
process oriented research practices. For example, use of the WSAP-D with simultaneous
pupillary reactivity recorded may help identify negative interpretation bias themes (e.g.,
accomplishment, symptom, or socially relevant) which can become the focus of therapy.
Specifically, unhelpful automatic interpretation biases could be assessed via WSAP-D behavioral
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indices and provide a clinician with area themes to focus thought challenging exercises as well as
potential insight into pathological core beliefs. Further, extant reinterpretation processes may be
observed via pupillary reactivity indices suggesting areas in which reinterpretation occurs but
was initially biased. Finally, repeated measurement during and after therapeutic treatment may
provide evidence of strengthened reinterpretation abilities or potentially evidence of changes to
automatic biases in line with those observed in healthy, never depressed individuals.
An avenue in which a physiological indicator of reinterpretation may be of use in
characterizing depression would be in understanding the hedonic benefit of benign
interpretations in and after a major depressive episode. Our study found that although the MDD
group made benign interpretations, they displayed less pupillary reactivity compared to the HC
group. This suggests the benign interpretations were less salient to the MDD group and that they
may not “believe” them to the same extent as negative interpretations. If replicable, this effect
could be used to assess whether benign interpretations benefit formally depressed individuals.
Evidence of similar responses to benign interpretations in a formally depressed group of
individuals would suggest that decreased reactivity is depression state dependent. However, if
decreased reactivity remained in a remitted depressed group, it would indicate that low hedonic
benefit from benign interpretations is an individual trait – and therefore a potential risk factor for
developing major depression. Given evidence that high-risk, never-depressed individuals
demonstrate similar rates of positive interpretation bias compared to low-risk, never-depressed
individuals with increased negative interpretation bias (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009), it is possible
that evidence of decreased engagement with positive information is an early indicator of
vulnerability.
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Limitations
The results of this study should be considered in light of a few limitations. First, given
that modest effect sizes (d=.29-.31) characterized the observed group differences in pupillary
reactivity, it is possible that we were underpowered to observe differences in the negative
interpretation indices due to fewer overall trials indicative of negative interpretation within the
HC sample. Future studies should address this limitation through use of a larger sample size.
Second, the WSAP-D defines trial types based on participant responses, which can lead to
inconsistent cell sizes in comparison analyses. While our sample was sufficiently powered to
observe medium to large effects, small effects in both the reaction time indices and the pupillary
reactivity data were potentially underpowered. Future studies should address this design issue
through use of either a greater number of trials to increase the likelihood of varied responses
from each participant or through inclusion of stimuli which never depressed healthy control
individuals would be more likely to interpret negatively. A further limitation is that our pupillary
data was processed so that waveforms were time locked rather than stimulus locked. The pupil
dilation data was processed in this manner due to the large number of initial conditions in the
task, which led to 90 data points (9 conditions by 10 time points) per person. While this is an
excellent starting point in terms of examining standardized waveforms across conditions and
between groups, it limits some analyses of interest – particularly reaction time locked
comparisons examining potential group by condition interactions or specific waveform
differences where response times were smoothed in a general time span. Future studies, or
secondary analyses led by specific hypotheses, should process pupillary data in multiple manners
to further increase interpretability of pupillary reactivity data.
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Contributions
Despite these limitations, the present study makes a number of scientific contributions.
Primarily, this is the first study to report automatic interpretation biases, based on both response
and reaction time indices, in a clinically depressed sample of individuals. This finding builds
upon previous work using subthreshold or self-reported samples and indicates that the WSAP-D
may be a consistent measure of automatic interpretation biases in depression. Second, this study
is the first to assess physiological reactivity, through pupillary dilation, during an automatic
interpretation bias task. The pupillary reactivity data suggests that cognitive processing differs
between groups relative to both unchallenged information processing (sentence only
comparisons) and specific interpretation biases (benign endorsement trials). These findings
suggest that individuals with depression differentially process ambiguous information in a way
consistent with cognitive theories of depression and may benefit less from processing biases
which are consistent with healthy patterned responding. As such, this study contributes evidence
to the cognitive theoretical framework of major depression as well as provides a starting point
for future studies assessing changes in interpretation biases in the course of treatment and
whether such biases are a risk factor for depression, an indicator of current depression, or both.
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Appendix A: Demographics, Health, and Family History Questionnaire
Demographics
Age: _____ years
Gender:
_____ Male _____ Female
Marital Status: Please check your current marital status.
_____ Single
_____ Married
_____ Domestic partner (living together)
_____ Separated
_____ Divorced
_____ Widowed
Children: If applicable, please provide the following information about your children.
Number of children: __________
Age and sex of each child: __________
__________ __________ __________
Education: Please check the highest level of schooling that you completed.
_____ Elementary school
_____ Junior high school
_____ High school
_____ Some college
_____ Technical school
_____ Junior college
_____ Four-year college
_____ Graduate or professional degree
Occupation: ______________________
Please indicate which of the following categories best describes your occupation. Select only one
category.
1. Higher executive of large company, proprietor, or major professional
2. Business manager, proprietor of medium-sized business, or lesser professional
3. Administrative personnel, owner of small business, or minor professional
4. Clerical and sales worker, technician, or owner of very small business
5. Skilled manual employee
6. Machine operator or semiskilled employee
7. Unskilled employee
8. Unemployed and receiving public assistance
9. Unemployed and not receiving public assistance
Income (optional): Please check your annual household income. (Include all sources of income
– wages of everyone contributing to your home, any alimony, child support, welfare, or any
other source of income.)
_____0$ - $4,999
_____$20,000 - $24,999
_____$55,000 - $64,999
_____$5,000 - $9,999
_____$25,000 - $34,999
_____$65,000 - $74,999
_____$10,000 - $14,999
_____$35,000 - $44,999
_____$75,000 - $100,000.
_____$15,000 - $19,999
_____$45,000 - $54,999
_____More than $100,000
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Health Questionnaire
INSTRUCTIONS: If you can answer YES to the question asked, put a circle around the Yes. If
you have to answer NO to the question asked, put a circle around the No. Answer all questions.
If you are not sure, guess.
1.

Do you often catch severe colds?

YES

NO

2.

When you catch a cold, do you always have to go to bed?

YES

NO

3.

Do you sometimes have severe soaking sweats at night?

YES

NO

4.

Does heart trouble run in your family?

YES

NO

5.

Do you often suffer from an upset stomach?

YES

NO

6.

Do you suffer from indigestion?

YES

NO

7.

Do you suffer from frequently loose bowel movements?

YES

NO

8.

Do you constantly suffer from bad constipation?

YES

NO

9.

Are your joints often painfully swollen?

YES

NO

10.

Do your muscles and joints constantly feel stiff?

YES

NO

11.

Do pains in the back make it hard for you to keep up with your work?

YES

NO

12.

Do you suffer badly from frequent severe headaches?

YES

NO

13.

Do you often have spells of severe dizziness?

YES

NO

14.

Do you frequently feel faint?

YES

NO

15.

Have you fainted more than twice in your life?

YES

NO

16.

Do you have constant numbness or tingling in any part of your body?

YES

NO

17.

Do you often get spells of complete exhaustion or fatigue?

YES

NO

18.

Does working tire you out completely?

YES

NO

19.

Do you usually get up tired and exhausted in the morning?

YES

NO

20.

Does every little effort wear you out?

YES

NO

21.

Are you frequently ill?

YES

NO

22.

Are you frequently confined to bed by illness?

YES

NO

23.

Do severe pains and aches make it impossible for you to do your work?

YES

NO

24.

Are you definitely under weight?

YES

NO

25.

Are you definitely over weight?

YES

NO
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FEMALES ONLY
26.
Have your menstrual periods usually been painful?

YES

NO

27.

Have you often felt weak or sick with your periods?

YES

NO

28.

Have you often had to lie down when your periods came on?

YES

NO

29.

Have you usually been tense or jumpy with your periods?

YES

NO

30.

Have you ever had constant severe hot flashes and sweats?

YES

NO
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Medical History Checklist
Please check ALL PAST and CURRENT illnesses or conditions diagnosed by a physician.
DO NOT check items that you have self-diagnosed, or that you believe you may have
experienced.

Abnormal EEG

Diabetes Mellitis

Irritable Bowel

Acute Sinusitis

Diabetes Type 1
Syndrome

ADHD

Diabetes Type 2

Joint Pain

Attention Deficit

Diabetic Neuropathy

Kidney Disease
Disorder

Diverticuli Disease

Kidney Stones

Alcoholism

Drug Sensitive

Knee Surgery

Allergies

Drug Allergy

Liver Disease

Alzheimer’s

Eczema

Lupus

AIDS/HIV

Elevated Liver

Major Depression

Anemia
Enzymes

Malignant Melanoma

Angina

Emphysema

Memory Loss

Anorexia

Endometriosis

Migraine

Appendicitis

Epilepsy

Mild Cognitive

Arthritis

Fatigue
Impairment

Asthma

Fibrocystic Breast

Multiple Sclerosis

Bipolar
Disease

Myocardial Infarction

Bipolar 2

Fibromyalgia

Nausea

Bipolar Manic

Gallbladder disease

NSAID Medication
Depressive

Gastric Ulcer

Obesity

Birth Control

Gastrointestinal Ulcers

Obsessive Compulsive

Bleeding Disorders

General Anxiety
Disorder

Bronchitis
Disorder

Oral Contraceptives

Bulimia

GERD

Osteoarthritis

Cancer

Glaucoma

Osteoarthritis of the

Cardiac Arrhythmia

Gonorrhea or
hip

Cataracts
Chlamydia

Osteoarthritis of the

Chemical Dependency

Gout
knee

Cholecystectomy

Headache

Osteopenia

Chronic Back Pain

Hepatitis A

Osteoporosis

Chronic Lower Back

Hepatitis B

Overactive Bladder
Pain

Hepatitis C

Pacemaker

Chronic Obstructive

Herpes

Panic Disorder
Pulmonary Disease

High Cholesterol

Peripheral Neuropathy

Chronic Pain

High Blood Pressure

Peripheral Vascular

Chronic Sinusitis

Hip Surgery
Disease

Congestive Heart

Hormone Therapy

Pneumonia
Failure

Hot Flashes

Polio

Constipation

Hypoactive Sexual

Postmenopausal

Crohn’s Disease
Desire

Postmenopausal

Depression

Hysterectomy
Depression

Depression with

Insomnia

Post Traumatic Stress
Psychosis
Disorder
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Prostatitis
Psoriasis and similar
Rheumatic Fever
Rheumatoid Arthritis
Rosacea
Schizophrenic
Disorders
Scoliosis










Shingles
Sleep Apnea
Smoker
Spinal Meningitis
Stroke/TIA
Substance Abuse
Suicide Attempt
Thyroid Problems
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Tubal Ligation
Tuberculosis
Ulcerative Proctitis
Urinary Incontinence
Uterine Fibroids
Vascular Dementia
Atopic Dermatitis
Cocaine Abuse

Appendix B: Beck Depression Inventory Second-Edition
BDI-II
This questionnaire consists of 21 groups of statements. Please read each group of statements
carefully, and then pick out the ONE STATEMENT in each group that bests describes the way
you have been feeling during the PAST TWO WEEKS, INCLUDING TODAY. Circle the
number beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply
equally well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than
one statement for any group, including Item 16 (Changes in sleeping pattern) or Item 18
(Changes in Appetite).
1. Sadness
1 I feel I may be punished.
0 I do not feel sad.
2 I expect to be punished.
1 I feel sad much of the time.
3 I feel I am being punished.
2 I am sad all the time.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand
it.
7. Self-Dislike
2. Pessimism
0 I feel the same about myself as ever.
0 I am not discouraged about my future.
1 I have lost confidence in myself.
1 I feel more discouraged about my future
2 I am disappointed in myself.
than I used to be.
3 I dislike myself.
2 I do not expect things to work out for
8. Self-Criticalness
me.
0 I don't criticize or blame myself more
3 I feel that my future is hopeless and will
than usual.
only get worse.
1 I am more critical of myself than I used
3. Past Failure
to be.
0 I do not feel like a failure.
2 I criticize myself for all of my faults.
1 I have failed more than I should have.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that
2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
happens.
3 I feel I am a total failure as a person.
9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes
4. Loss of Pleasure
0 I don't have any thoughts of killing
0 I get as much pleasure as I ever did
myself.
from the things I enjoy.
1 I have thoughts of killing myself, but I
1 I don't enjoy things as much as I used
would
to.
not carry them out.
2 I get very little pleasure from the things
2 I would like to kill myself.
I used to enjoy.
3 I would kill myself if I had the chance.
3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I 10. Crying
used to enjoy.
0 I don't cry any more than I used to.
5. Guilty Feelings
1 I cry more than I used to.
0 I don't feel particularly guilty.
2 I cry over every little thing.
1 I feel guilty over many things I have
3 I feel like crying, but I can't.
done or should have done.
11. Agitation
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
0 I am no more restless or wound up than
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
usual.
6. Punishment Feelings
1 I feel more restless or wound up than
0 I don't feel I am being punished.
usual.
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2
3

I am so restless or agitated that it's hard
to stay still.
I am so restless or agitated that I have
to
keep moving or doing something.

12. Loss of Interest
0 I have not lost interest in other people
or activities
1 I am less interested in other people or
things than before.
2 I have lost most of my interest in other
people or things
3 It's hard to get interested in anything.
13. Indecisiveness
0 I make decisions about as well as ever.
1 I find it more difficult to make
decisions than usual.
2 I have much greater difficulty in
making decisions than I used to.
3 I have trouble making any decisions.
14. Worthlessness
0 I don't feel I am worthless.
1 I do not consider myself as worthwhile
and
useful as I used to.
2 I feel more worthless as compared to
other people.
3 I feel utterly worthless.
15. Loss of Energy
0 I have as much energy as ever.
1 I have less energy than I used to have.
2 I don't have enough energy to do very
much.
3 I don't have enough energy to do
anything.
16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern
0 I have not experienced any change in
my sleeping pattern.

-------------------------------------1a I sleep somewhat more than usual.
1b I sleep somewhat less than usual.
-------------------------------------2a I sleep a lot more than usual.
2b I sleep a lot less than usual.
-------------------------------------3a I sleep most of the day.
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get
back to sleep.
17. Irritability
0 I am no more irritable than usual.
1 I am more irritable than usual.
2 I am much more irritable than usual.
3 I am irritable all the time.
18. Changes in Appetite
0 I have not experienced any change in
my appetite.
-------------------------------------1a My appetite is somewhat less than
usual.
1b My appetite is somewhat greater than
usual.
-------------------------------------2a My appetite is much less than before.
2b My appetite is much greater than usual.
-------------------------------------3a I have no appetite at all.
3b I crave food all the time.
19. Concentration Difficulty
0 I can concentrate as well as ever.
1 I can't concentrate as well as usual.
2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything
for
very long.
3 I find I can't concentrate on anything.
20. Tiredness or Fatigue
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than
usual.
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily
than usual.
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of
the things I used to do.
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3

I am too tired or fatigued to do most of
the things I used to do.

1
2
3

21. Loss of interest in Sex
0 I have not noticed any recent change in
my interest in sex.
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I am less interested in sex than I used to
be.
I am much less interested in sex now.
I have lost interest in sex completely.

Appendix C: Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
STAI Y-1
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people used to describe themselves are given below.
Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement to indicate
how you feel RIGHT NOW, that is, at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not
spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe your present
feelings best.
Not SomeModerVery
at
what
ately
much
all
so
so
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

I feel calm .................................................................... (1)
I feel secure ................................................................. (1)
I feel tense ................................................................... (1)
I feel strained ............................................................... (1)
I feel at ease ................................................................. (1)
I feel upset ................................................................... (1)
I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes .... (1)
I feel satisfied .............................................................. (1)
I feel frightened ........................................................... (1)
I feel comfortable ........................................................ (1)
I feel self-confident ..................................................... (1)
I feel nervous ............................................................... (1)
I feel jittery .................................................................. (1)
I feel indecisive ........................................................... (1)
I feel relaxed ................................................................ (1)
I feel content ................................................................ (1)
I am worried ................................................................ (1)
I feel confused ............................................................. (1)
I feel steady ................................................................. (1)
I feel pleasant ............................................................... (1)
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(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)

(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)

(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)

SELF-EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE
STAI Y-2
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people used to describe themselves are given below.
Read each statement and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of the statement to indicate
how you GENERALLY feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on
any one statement but give the answer which seems to describe how you generally feel.
Not
SomeModerVery
at
what
ately
much
all
so
so
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

I feel pleasant ............................................................... (1)
I feel nervous and restless ........................................... (1)
I feel satisfied with myself .......................................... (1)
I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be .......... (1)
I feel like a failure ....................................................... (1)
I feel rested .................................................................. (1)
I am calm, cool, and collected ..................................... (1)
I feel that difficulties are piling up so
that I cannot overcome them ....................................... (1)
I worry too much over something that
really doesn’t matter .................................................... (1)
I am happy ................................................................... (1)
I have disturbing thoughts ........................................... (1)
I lack self-confidence .................................................. (1)
I feel secure ................................................................. (1)
I make decisions easily ................................................ (1)
I feel inadequate .......................................................... (1)
I am content ................................................................. (1)
Some unimportant thought runs through
my mind and bothers me ............................................. (1)
I take disappointments so keenly that
I can’t put them out of my mind .................................. (1)
I am a steady person .................................................... (1)
I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think
over my recent concerns and interests ......................... (1)
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(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)

(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)

(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(2)

(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)

(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)
(4)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(2)
(2)

(3)
(3)

(4)
(4)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Appendix D: Positive and Negative Affect Scale
PANAS
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.
Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word.
Indicate to what extent you have these feelings RIGHT NOW. Use the following scale
to record your answers:
1
2
3
4
5
very slightly
a little
moderately
quite a bit
extremely
or not at all
1. Guilty_________

12. Determined______

2. Scared_________

13. Attentive______

3. Hostile_________

14. Jittery______

4. Enthusiastic_______

15. Active_______

5. Interested_______

16. Irritable______

6. Distressed_______

17. Alert______

7. Excited_______

18. Ashamed_______

8. Upset_______

19. Happy______

9. Strong_______

20. Proud_______

10. Nervous________

21. Afraid_______

11. Depressed_______

22. Inspired________
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Appendix E: Word Sentence Association Paradigm for Depression - Stimuli Set
Self-relevant sentence
A warm feeling spreads from your stomach to your chest.
A friend does not respond when you wave hello.
A friend sets you up on a blind date.
You hear a loud noise at night.
An old friend comments on how you look different now.
Colleagues found your views unusual.
Everyone stops talking when you enter the room.
For a moment you forget where you are.
People believe you have to think about stuff for a long
time.
People judge the speech you just gave.
People laugh after something you said.
Someone comments on your new outfit at a party.
Someone looks at you as you walk by.
Someone you like says hello to you.
Sometimes your limbs go numb unexpectedly.
Suddenly time seems to slow down and everything seems
strange to you.
The air is not clear and you find it hard to see.
The plumber sends you the bill.
You see no quick exit from this room.
While running errands you feel a hot flash.
You and a classmate accidentally bump into each other.
You are at a party with a friend.
You are far away from your local hospital.
You are interviewing for a job.
You are invited to a party.
You are on a first date.
You are playing at the beach.
You are standing next to an attractive person.
You are unsure of your test score.
You begin to tremble when you walk outside.
You cannot fall asleep.
You cannot find your favorite shirt.
You experience a sense of unreality.
You feel detached from your body.
You feel distracted then find that your thoughts are
random.
You feel nauseous.
You feel weak.
You have a change in salary.
You have several options for places to live.
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negative word
Illness
Mad
Uncomfortable
Robber
Ugly
Weird
Mocked
Going Crazy

benign word
Soup
Distracted
Comfortable
Fireworks
Attractive
Cool
Respected
Dreamy

Stupid

Smart

Dumb
Embarrassing
Hideous
Weird
Pity
Disordered

Intelligent
Funny
Good-Looking
Cool
Admire
Asleep

Emergency

Dozing

Pollution
Unaffordable
Urgent
Disabled
Embarrassing
Stay close
Unprotected
Boring
Avoid
Good-looking
Ugly
Look away
Drop class
Faint
Pills
Stolen
Crazy
Death

Fog
Reasonable
Unnecessary
Summer
Funny
Venture out
Vacation
Captivating
Fun
Hideous
Attractive
Smile
Think positive
Chilly
Relaxation
Borrowed
Daydream
Meditative

Helpless

Imagination

Get Help
Breakdown
Pay cut
Stressful

Indigestion
Tired
Raise
Exciting

You have to throw a party for the office.
You have to write an essay about achievements in your
life.
You hear your name mentioned in a nearby conversation.
You just finished taking an oral exam.
You just got your yearbook pictures back.
You laugh differently than other people.
You notice someone pointing in your direction.
You notice your breath is uneven and uncontrollable.
You receive a call from a company you interviewed with.
You receive a call from a loan officer.
You receive a letter from the IRS.
You receive an unexpected grade on your test.
You see a big flash of light.
You see a group of people approaching.
You spent too much money.
You stand up to introduce yourself at a meeting.
You take a long time to make decisions about the future.
Your advisor examines your schedule for next year.
Your bank statement is surprising.
Your body feels sweaty.
Your boss calls you into his office.
Your boss wants to meet with you.
Your child does not sleep at home tonight.
Your Christmas party turns out different than last year.
Your classmates are surprised by your project.
Your competition is good.
Your face feels moist with sweat.
Your friend asks you to go to a party.
Your friend comments on your new haircut.
Your friend does not call you back.
Your friend does not return your call.
Your friend opens your present and makes a face.
Your friends are surprised at your painting.
Your friends think of you differently after a long road trip.
Your front door is open.
You notice your money is not here.
Your picture is going to be in the newspaper.
Your stomach has been bothering you today.
Your taxes are due.
Your teacher calls on you to answer.
Your teacher wrote many comments on your essay.
Your test will be difficult.
You are confused because you are thinking about so many
things at once.
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Disliked

Well-liked

Disaster

Success

Mocked
Stupid
Ugly
Weird
Hideous
Threat
Rejection
Declined
Owe
Dumb
Bomb
Walk away
Worry
Uncomfortable
Confused
Worried
Broke
Unwell
Avoid
Criticize
Kidnapped
Disaster
Disaster
Quit
Frail
Stay Home
Pity
Upset
Missing
Disappointed
Disliked
Boring
Call police
Stolen
Panicky
Horrible
Procrastinate
Uncomfortable
Criticize
Stress

Respected
Smart
Attractive
Cool
Beautiful
Laughing
Acceptance
Approved
Refund
Intelligent
Camera
Greet
Save
Comfortable
Careful
Calm
Wealthy
Sunny
Enter
Praise
Sleepover
Better
Success
Try hard
Exercise
Dance
Admire
Try Later
Vacation
Happy
Well-liked
Captivating
Close
Bank
Excited
Manageable
Get Refund
Capable
Praise
Study

Hysterical

Make a List

You cannot recall if you locked your car door.
You cannot remember if you correctly addressed a letter.
You suddenly think about someone dying.
An insect is on your window.
It is a very hot day and you are on a crowded subway.
You get a new coworker in the cubicle next to you.
You go past a power plant and think you were exposed to
radiation.
Several of your friends came to visit you at your house.
The doctor examined your growth.
You leave the door unlocked.

Break in

You watch the television news program.
You open the window in your bedroom.
You come home and find a letter in your mailbox.
The doorman at your apartment building has a package for
you.
The mailroom at work notifies you that they have a
package for you.
When you turn on your computer the screen flashes.
Today is marked on your calendar.
You cannot roll your car window up.
There is a delivery waiting for you when you get to work.
The floor you are walking on is wet.
A policeman comes to your door.
You are in bed until noon.
You do not want to get out of bed.
You do not want lunch.
You do not want dinner.
Your boss is not happy with your report.
You do poorly on an exam.
You get a bad paper grade.
Your favorite newspaper comic is cancelled.
You want to continue sleeping.
You want to take a nap.
You go to a bar.
You go to dinner with friends.
You are home alone.
You go to a coffee shop alone.
You watch television.
You turn down a party invitation.
You refuse a dinner invite.
You get a promotion.
You listen to an emotional song.
Your boss ignores your input.
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Unsafe
Disaster
Responsible
Germs
Exit
Avoid

Safe
Deliver
Meaningless
Small
Fan
Befriend

Panic

Irrational

Contaminated
Cancer

Homicide
Burglary
Collections

Fun
Weight
Expecting
Company
Weather
Cold
Card

Eviction

Free Rent

Collection
Notice
Crashing
Deadline
Broken
Severance
Flooded
Car Accident
Upset
Sad
Nauseous
Upset
Angry
Stupid
Dumb
Weird
Exhausted
Unhappy
Alone
Outcaste
Unwanted
Outcast
Sad
Guilty
Ashamed
Undeserved
Sob
Worthless

Cookies
Startup
Celebration
Tray
Flowers
Cleaned
Fund-Raising
Newspaper
Comfortable
Big Breakfast
Big Lunch
Bad News
Bad Luck
Hard Grader
New Comics
Late Night
Good Game
New People
Fun
Relaxing
Delicious
Funny
Busy
Engaged
Excited
Smirk
Distracted

Your friend ignores your advice.
Someone is talking a cell phone next to you.
You lie awake in bed.
You cannot sleep.
You miss your bus.
Your car will not start.
You go out with friends.
You visit your family.
You have trouble with an assignment.
You are stuck at home by yourself for a week after a
surgery.
You have been asked to take on a new responsibility at
work.
Someone asks you to help them move to a new house.
Your parents expect you to vacation with them at home.
People are confused by your opinions.
You try to break up an argument.
Your boss says your report is not what he expected.
You get a new job.
Your car breaks down and you have to ride a bike to work.
You get only one follow up job interview.
You go for a run and stop after one mile.
You stay home with a loved one instead of going out with
friends.
You go for a ride on a horse and he starts to gallop.
People stare at you while you shop.
Everybody calls to tell you what they are doing.
Your friends take you out after your significant other
leaves you.
People always tell you to smile.
You see an attractive person looking at you from across the
room.
You need help with a report.
You are stuck at home alone with the flu.
You are asked to start a new project at work.
You supervisor is surprised by your report.
You get a promotion.
You want to move your bed but are alone.
You sing along to a song.
You have only one job interview.
You go the gym for a half hour.
You get an B+ on your exam.
You are paddling and your canoe starts to tip.
People stare at you at a restaurant.
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Useless
Annoyed
Distressed
Angry
Punished
Punitive
Bored
Tiresome
Helpless

Stubborn
Day-Dreaming
Excited
Delighted
Walk
Bus
Happy
Joyful
Capable

Incapacitated

Self-Sufficient

Inadequate

Adequate

Powerless
Trapped
Inferior
Ineffective
Incompetent
Unqualified
Debilitated
Failure
Defective

Powerful
Free
Superior
Effective
Competent
Qualified
Strong
Successful
Great

Needy

Independent

Out of control
Unattractive
Alone

In control
Beautiful
Popular

Uncared for

Cared For

Defective

Loved

Loser

Loved

Helpless
Incapacitated
Inadequate
Incompetent
Unqualified
Weak
Vulnerable
Failure
Defective
Not good
enough
Out of control
Unattractive

Capable
Self-Sufficient
Adequate
Competent
Qualified
Strong
Invulnerable
Successful
Great
Superb
In control
Beautiful

You hear a friend make a joke about you.
Your friends tell you about a movie they saw together.
You are told by your parents about your sister getting
married.
The project you want is given to a co-worker.
You hear someone whispering about you.
People tell you to laugh more often.
Your parents watch you closely.
You see an attractive person looking at you in the store.
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Rejected
Alone

Accepted
Popular

Unwanted

Wanted

Worthless
Different
Defective
Not good
enough
Loser

Worthy
Special
Loved
Adored
Loved

Appendix F: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model Results Tables
Table F1: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model of Pupillary Reactivity Comparing Sentence
Only Condition to WSAP-D Conditions
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p
Value
Condition*Group*Time
0.0008
-0.0004, 0.0020
.199
Condition*Group
-0.0088
-0.0205, 0.0030
.143
Group*Time
-0.0246
-0.0844, 0.0351
.415
Condition
0.0131
-0.0026, 0.0288
.102
Group
0.0894
0.0078, 0.1710
.032
Time
0.0821
-0.0117, 0.1759
.086
2
Time
-0.0006
-0.0286, 0.0275
.968
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0089
0.0065, 0.0122
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.2067
-0.031, 0.4229
.086
Residual
0.0409
0.0391, 0.0430
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
-582.99
AIC
-576.99
BIC
-558.39
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Table F2: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model of Pupillary Reactivity Comparing Groups on
Sentence Only Condtion
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p
Value
Group*Time
-0.0137
-0.0874, 0.0601
.713
Group
0.0817
-0.0218, 0.1851
.121
Time
0.0721
-0.0443, 0.1885
.223
2
Time
-0.0003
-0.0347, 0.0342
.988
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0134
0.0096, 0.0186
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.3738
0.1387, 0.5689
.001
Residual
0.0113
0.0095, 0.0133
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
-38.01
AIC
-32.01
BIC
-20.04
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Table F3: MDD Group Mixed Effects Multilevel Models Comparing of Pupillary
Reactivity Between Sentence Only Condition and WSAP-D Benign Interpretation
Conditions
Model Including All Conditions within MDD Group
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
Value
Condition
0.0083
0.0012, 0.0155
.022
Time
0.0594
0.0123, 0.1065
.014
2
Time
-0.0021
-0.0464, 0.0423
.925
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0111
0.0072, 0.0171
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.1694
-0.1620, 0.4665
.307
Residual
0.0429
0.0401, 0.0458
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
-209.27
AIC
-203.27
BIC
-186.69
Model Comparing Sentence Only and Benign Endorsement Conditions
Fixed effect
Coefficient
Value
Condition
0.0026
-0.0102, 0.0492
Time
0.0693
0.0119, 0.1267
2
Time
-0.0028
-0.0549, 0.0492
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0151
0.0095, 0.0241
AR1 Rho
0.4032
0.0690, 0.6560
Residual
0.0333
0.0296, 0.0375
Model Fit
Χ2
-11.87
AIC
-5.87
BIC
-7.40
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95% CI
.501
.019
.913
p Value
<.001
.008
<.001

p

p

Table F3 Continued:
Model Comparing Sentence Only and Negative Rejection Conditions
Fixed effect
Coefficient
Value
Condition
-0.0507
-0.0822, -0.0191
Time
0.0557
0.0073, 0.1041
Time2
-0.0016
-0.0429, 0.0396
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0096
0.0062, 0.0147
AR1 Rho
0.1773
-0.1644, 0.4810
Residual
0.0356
0.0316, 0.0400
Model Fit
Χ2
1.72
AIC
7.72
BIC
20.99
Model Comparing Sentence Only and Benign Rejection Conditions
Fixed effect
Coefficient
Value
Condition
-0.0041
-0.0074, 0.0156
Time
0.0515
-0.0016, 0.1046
2
Time
-0.0014
-0.0468, 0.0439
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0115
0.0074, 0.0180
AR1 Rho
0.2955
-0.0506, 0.5783
Residual
0.0426
0.0379, 0.0479
Model Fit
Χ2
114.67
AIC
120.67
BIC
133.95
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95% CI

p

.002
.025
.938
p Value
<.001
.299
<.001

95% CI
.484
.057
.949
p Value
<.001
.074
<.001

p

Table F4: HC Group Mixed Effects Multilevel Models Comparing of Pupillary Reactivity
Between Sentence Only Condition and WSAP-D Negative Interpretation Conditions
Model Including All Conditions within HC Group
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p
Value
Condition
0.0036
-0.0034, 0.0106
.314
Time
0.0376
-0.0016, 0.0768
.060
2
Time
0.0010
-0.0350, 0.0370
.955
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0069
0.0044, 0.0110
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.2520
-0.1031, 0.5501
.144
Residual
0.0390
0.0365, 0.0417
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
-386.06
AIC
-380.06
BIC
-363.61
Model Comparing Sentence Only and Negative Endorsement Conditions
Fixed effect
Coefficient
Value
Condition
0.0060
-0.0044, 0.0164
Time
0.0342
-0.0048, 0.0731
Time2
0.0015
-0.0338, 0.0367
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0066
0.0042, 0.0105
AR1 Rho
0.1641
-0.1962, 0.4773
Residual
0.0148
0.0131, 0.0167
Model Fit
Χ2
-489.66
AIC
-483.66
BIC
-470.52
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95%CI
.256
.084
.933
p Value
<.001
.350
<.001

p

Table F4 Continued
Model Comparing Sentence Only and Benign Rejection Conditions
Fixed effect
Coefficient
Value
Condition
0.0186
0.0061, 0.0311
Time
0.0316
-0.0224, 0.0857
Time2
0.0018
-0.0431, 0.0468
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0107
0.0067, 0.0172
AR1 Rho
0.3544
0.0060, 0.6260
Residual
0.0482
0.0427, 0.0543
Model Fit
Χ2
174.16
AIC
180.16
BIC
193.30
Model Comparing Sentence Only and Negative Rejection Conditions
Fixed effect
Coefficient
Value
Condition
0.0173
-0.0140, 0.0486
Time
0.0424
0.0047, 0.0802
2
Time
0.0008
-0.0273, 0.0289
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0042
0.0026, 0.0068
AR1 Rho
0.2998
-0.1380, 0.5419
Residual
0.0335
0.0298, 0.0378
Model Fit
Χ2
-66.42
AIC
-60.42
BIC
-47.28
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95% CI

p

.004
.248
.935
p Value
<.001
.029
<.001

95% CI
.279
.028
.954
p Value
<.001
.202
<.001

p

Table F5: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model of Pupillary Reactivity Comparing Sentence
Only Condition to Negative Rejection Condition Between Groups
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p
Value
Condition*Group
0.0680
0.0236, 0.1124
.003
Condition
-0.1186
-0.1884, -0.0489
.001
Group
-0.2626
-0.4731, -0.0521
.015
Time
0.0492
0.0187, 0.0797
.002
2
Time
-0.0004
-0.0250, 0.0241
.973
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0068
0.0050, 0.0093
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.2048
-0.0439, 0.4295
.096
Residual
0.0346
0.0318, 0.0376
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
-68.28
AIC
-62.28
BIC
-46.98
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Table F6: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model of Pupillary Reactivity Comparing Sentence
Only Condition to Benign Rejection Condition Between Groups
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p Value
Condition*Group
0.0145
-0.0024, 0.0314
.093
Condition
-0.0104
-0.0370, 0.0162
.443
Group
0.0088
-0.1062, 0.1238
.880
Time
0.0418
0.0049, 0.0787
.027
2
Time
0.0002
-0.0304, 0.0307
.992
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0106
0.0077, 0.0145
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.3243
0.0870, 0.5268
.004
Residual
0.0452
0.0416, 0.0491
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
242.65
AIC
260.65
BIC
306.57
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Table F7: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model of Pupillary Reactivity to Sentence Across All
Trials
MLM with Interaction Effect
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p Value
Condition*Group
-0.0084
-0.0237, 0.0069
.281
Condition
0.0157
-0.0083, 0.0397
.200
Group
0.0879
0.0112, 0.1646
.025
Time
-0.1202
-0.2083, -0.0321
.008
2
Time
0.0277
-0.0008, 0.0561
.057
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0041
0.0026, 0.0064
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.4092
0.1121, 0.6392
.003
Residual
0.0318
0.0292, 0.0346
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
-427.13
AIC
-421.13
BIC
-405.84
MLM with Main Effects Only
Fixed effect
Condition
Group
Time
Time2
Random effect
Intercept + time + Time2
AR1 Diagonal
AR1 Rho
Residual
Model Fit
Χ2
AIC
BIC

Coefficient
95% CI
0.0032
-0.0044, 0.0108
0.0646
0.0004, 0.1288
-0.1202
-0.2083, -0.0321
0.0277
-0.0008, 0.0561
Variance Component 95% CI

p Value
.414
.049
.008
.057
p Value

0.0041
0.4092
0.0318

<.001
.003
<.001

0.0026, 0.0064
0.1121, 0.6392
0.0293, 0.0346

-433.84
-427.84
-412.54
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Table F8: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model of Pupillary Reactivity Between Groups Across
WSAP-D Conditions
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p Value
Group*Valence
-0.0377
-0.0657, -0.0096
.009
Response*Valence
0.0324
0.0043, 0.0605
.024
Valence
0.0423
-0.0187, 0.1033
.174
Response
-0.0690
-0.1134, -0.0246
.002
Group
0.1143
0.0290, 0.1995
.009
Time
0.0484
0.0192, 0.0776
.001
2
Time
-0.0006
-0.0272, 0.0260
.964
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0080
0.0059, 0.0110
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.1982
-0.0430, 0.4175
.097
Residual
0.0415
0.0395, 0.0437
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
-427.34
AIC
-421.34
BIC
-403.10
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Table F9: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model of Pupillary Reactivity Between Groups Within
Endorsement Trials
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p Value
Group*Valence
-0.0508
-0.0808, -0.0209
.001
Valence
0.0943
0.0473, 0.1413
<.001
Group
0.1582
0.0705, 0.2458
<.001
Time
0.0544
0.0255, 0.0833
<.001
2
Time
-0.0011
-0.0270, 0.0247
.930
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0076
0.0055, 0.0104
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.2553
0.0100, 0.4717
.033
Residual
0.0236
0.0219, 0.0253
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
-822.21
AIC
-816.21
BIC
-800.05
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Table F10: Mixed Effects Multilevel Model of Pupillary Reactivity Between Groups Within
Rejection Trials
Fixed effect
Coefficient
95% CI
p Value
Group*Valence
-0.0245
-0.0706, 0.0216
.298
Valence
0.0874
0.0150, 0.1598
.018
Group
0.0600
-0.0541, 0.1743
.302
Time
0.0424
0.0102, 0.0745
.010
2
Time
<-0.0000
-0.0253, 0.0252
.995
Random effect
Variance Component 95% CI
p Value
2
Intercept + time + Time
AR1 Diagonal
0.0072
0.0052, 0.0099
<.001
AR1 Rho
0.2088
-0.0436, 0.4362
.094
Residual
0.0559
0.0520, 0.0600
<.001
Model Fit
Χ2
482.74
AIC
488.74
BIC
504.90
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Appendix G: Correlations Between Behavioral Data and Pupillary Reactivity
Table G1: Bivariate Correlations between WSAP-D Indices and Pupillary Reactivity
Baseline Relative Pupillary reactivity time point (ms from trial start)
WSAP-D Index

500

1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

3500

4000

4500

Neg End Rate -.286 -.232 -.184 -.211 -.235 -.254 -.317* -.343* -.354*
Ben End Rate .162 .104 .118 .181 .232 .251 .217
.221
.237
Neg End RT
.184 .102 .030 -.002 .016 .017 .009
.077
.093
Neg Rej RT
.148 .081 .042 .013 .043 .030 -.010
.054
.065
Ben End RT
.103 .032 -.036 -.062 -.011 .012 .002
.080
.078
Ben Rej RT
.163 .108 .060 .039 .065 .064 .042
.105
.106
Bivariate correlations between Word Sentence Association Paradigm for Depression (WSAP-D)
interpretation bias indices and pupillary reactivity outcome measure. * indicates statistical
significance of < .05. Neg End Rate = Negative Endorsement Rate; Ben End Rate = Benign
Endorsement Rate; Neg End RT = Negative Endorsement Reaction Time; Neg Rej RT =
Negative Rejection Reaction Time; Ben End RT = Benign Endorsement Reaction Time; Ben Rej
RT = Benign Rejection Reaction Time.
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